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 1. The Appendix at the end of this article contains references to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.  An Appendix containing references to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals is available on the William Mitchell Law Review website and in the 
electronic version of this article on Westlaw and LexisNexis.  Although paginated 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The restatements of torts have been used extensively by the 
Minnesota courts in cases covering a broad variety of issues.2  The 
black letter statements, comments, illustrations, and reporters’ 
notes frequently provide source authority for the courts in 
resolving those issues, although as Justice Anderson pointed out in 
his comments in the symposium, Flying Trampolines and Falling 
Bookcases: Understanding the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 
the restatements are considered with some degree of skepticism by 
the courts and their application is far from automatic.3 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm (Third Restatement), recently published by the 
American Law Institute (ALI),4 takes an approach to negligence law 
that is likely to prompt the same skepticism when Minnesota courts 
consider its application.  In separating foreseeability from duty and 
scope of liability (proximate cause) determinations and adopting a 
but-for standard to determine causation, the Third Restatement 
will seem to step on settled law in a way that is unfamiliar to lawyers 
and judges who are used to dealing with negligence law that 
integrates foreseeability in both duty and proximate cause and 
rejects the but-for test for causation because of its apparent lack of 
limitation.  The Third Restatement’s approach to negligence cases 
is intended to achieve greater clarity in negligence law, avoid the 
inconsistencies that result when courts engage in detailed analysis 
of adjudicative facts in the resolution of duty and scope of liability 
issues, and to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
functions of judge and jury in negligence cases. 
A skeptical supreme court considering whether to apply any 
part of the Third Restatement would have to be convinced that its 
 
within the issue, it is not contained in the hard copy of this publication.  The 
pagination for the remainder of Volume 37 follows as if both appendices were 
included in the hard copy of this publication.    
 2. See Appendix. 
 3. Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common 
Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007) (analyzing the criticism against the American Law 
Institute that it is stagnant and ignores contemporary practices of law in drafting 
the restatements); Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity?  Lessons from the 
Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423 (2004) (analyzing the pros and cons 
of the U.S. Virgin Islands adopting the restatements of law as its de facto common 
law). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
(2010). 
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own approach to negligence law leads to inconsistencies serious 
enough to require clarification, or that it gives judges too much 
authority to resolve cases as a matter of law based on the lack of a 
foreseeable risk of injury.  A detailed assessment of the law in any 
jurisdiction considering the Third Restatement is necessary for a 
court to make a reasoned judgment about its application. 
Minnesota’s negligence law is mainstream.  It includes four 
elements: duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages.5  
Foreseeability is an important consideration in Minnesota 
negligence law, certainly when courts analyze duty issues, and 
sometimes in their analysis of the proximate cause element.  The 
structure of that law encourages courts to aggressively police 
negligence cases to determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence is 
sufficient to justify submission of the case to a jury.  Detailed factual 
examination of the record often results in conclusions that the 
injury was not foreseeable.  That sometimes results in no-duty 
determinations,6 holdings that there is no breach of duty as a 
matter of law,7 that there is no proximate cause as a matter of law,8 
or even that the label makes no difference if the injury is 
unforeseeable.9 
A detailed understanding of how negligence law works in 
 
 5. E.g., Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001). 
 6. E.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009) (finding no 
duty because homeowners could not foresee visiting child would be injured 
climbing a bookcase). 
 7. E.g., Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 
138 (1967) (finding tenant could not foresee injury to maintenance person). 
 8. E.g., Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995) (holding 
snowmobiler’s conduct allegedly resulting in plaintiff driving his snowmobile into 
open water on a river and getting rear-ended by another snowmobile not a 
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries).  Primary assumption of risk also plays an 
important role as courts determine that even if there is a duty, the plaintiff 
effectively consented to relieve the defendant of that duty.  For a detailed 
examination of the Minnesota cases involving primary assumption of risk, see 
Michael K. Steenson, The Role of Primary Assumption of Risk in Civil Litigation in 
Minnesota, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 115 (2003). 
 9. Marshall v. Esco Indus., Inc., No. A08-2046, 2009 WL 2927474, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) (citations omitted) (holding that injury to security 
system maintenance worker injured while using a ladder found at defendant’s 
facility during course of servicing the security system was not reasonably 
foreseeable and stating that “[t]he issue of whether an injury was foreseeable to 
the defendant under the existing circumstances is sometimes examined as a 
proximate-cause issue, rather than an issue of negligence.  But ‘[i]n contemporary 
law, the terminology distinction has become unimportant.’  However the issue is 
characterized, courts agree that a defendant is not liable for unforeseeable 
harms.”). 
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Minnesota, or any other jurisdiction considering the Third 
Restatement for that matter, is only the first step.  Understanding 
how negligence law really works in a particular state and what 
impact the Third Restatement would have on the law may lead a 
court to conclude that negligence law works the way it is intended, 
that the role of foreseeability gives courts appropriate gatekeeping 
responsibilities consistent with the traditions and policy of 
negligence law, and that it is a familiar system to judges and lawyers 
who understand it and know how to apply it.  If so, a court may ask, 
as did the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in a recent decision 
apparently rejecting the Third Restatement’s position on the role 
of foreseeability in duty determinations, “Why mess with success?”10 
The purpose of this article is to provide a foundation for 
judges and lawyers, primarily in Minnesota, who are seeking to 
understand how the Third Restatement’s approach to negligence 
law fits with Minnesota negligence law.  The first Part of the article 
examines the approach of the Third Restatement.  Because 
decisions in other states applying the Third Restatement will be 
important for courts in Minnesota and elsewhere in deciding 
whether to apply the Third Restatement, the second Part examines 
early reports on the Third Restatement in Iowa, Nebraska, Arizona, 
Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Delaware. 
While the terms of acceptance of the Third Restatement have 
varied in those states, the decisions are good illustrations as to how 
the Third Restatement fits with developed bodies of negligence 
case law.  In particular, Thompson v. Kaczinski,11 decided last year by 
the Iowa Supreme Court, provides the most comprehensive 
acceptance of the Third Restatement’s approach and a mirror for 
courts curious about what the law would look like if it followed that 
approach.  The third Part analyzes Minnesota negligence law in 
detail.  The fourth Part compares Minnesota negligence law to the 
Third Restatement’s approach.  The fifth Part is the conclusion. 
II. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
The Third Restatement models a negligence theory intended 
to clarify negligence law, avoid inconsistencies in its application, 
and achieve an appropriate judge-jury balance in the resolution of 
negligence claims.  It seeks to do so by uncoupling foreseeability 
 
 10. Tesar v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 351, 357 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 11. 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009). 
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from the duty and scope of liability determinations and adopting a 
but-for standard for causation. 
The elements of a negligence case under the Third 
Restatement’s approach include (1) the duty issue and four factual 
elements, (2) failure to exercise reasonable care (the breach of 
duty issue), (3) factual cause, (4) physical harm, and (5) harm 
within the scope of liability (historically called proximate cause).12 
The basic duty standard is set out in section 7 of the Third 
Restatement: 
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical 
harm. 
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated 
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or 
limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may 
decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary 
duty of reasonable care requires modification. 
The Third Restatement position is that a duty exists whenever 
the actor’s conduct “creates a risk of physical harm,”13 without 
regard to whether the injury or harm that occurred was 
foreseeable.  There may be exceptions, however, in cases where a 
court determines that duty does not exist as a categorical matter 
(perhaps in cases involving recovery by a bystander in a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress case) or where the duty of 
reasonable care requires modification (perhaps in a case involving 
injury in competitive sports where a recklessness standard may be 
more appropriate than a general reasonable care standard).14 
Comment j to section 7 explains the absence of foreseeability 
in the duty determination: 
Foreseeable risk is an element in the determination of 
negligence.  In order to determine whether appropriate 
care was exercised, the factfinder must assess the 
foreseeable risk at the time of the defendant’s alleged 
negligence.  The extent of foreseeable risk depends on 
the specific facts of the case and cannot be usefully 
assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the facts 
may make a dramatic change in how much risk is 
 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
6 cmt. b (2010). 
 13. There is no duty if the actor has not created a risk of physical harm.  Id. § 
7(a). 
 14. See id. § 7(b). 
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foreseeable.  Thus, for reasons explained in Comment i, 
courts should leave such determinations to juries unless 
no reasonable person could differ on the matter. 
 A no-duty ruling represents a determination, a purely 
legal question, that no liability should be imposed on 
actors in a category of cases.  Such a ruling should be 
explained and justified based on articulated policies or 
principles that justify exempting these actors from liability 
or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care.  These 
reasons of policy and principle do not depend on the 
foreseeability of harm based on the specific facts of a case.  
They should be articulated directly without obscuring 
references to foreseeability.   
 Courts do appropriately rule that the defendant has not 
breached a duty of reasonable care when reasonable 
minds cannot differ on that question.  See Comment i.  
These determinations are based on the specific facts of 
the case, are applicable only to that case, and are 
appropriately cognizant of the role of the jury in factual 
determinations.  A lack of foreseeable risk in a specific 
case may be a basis for a no-breach determination, but 
such a ruling is not a no-duty determination.  Rather, it is 
a determination that no reasonable person could find that 
the defendant has breached the duty of reasonable care. 
 Despite widespread use of foreseeability in no-duty 
determinations, this Restatement disapproves that 
practice and limits no-duty rulings to articulated policy or 
principle in order to facilitate more transparent 
explanations of the reasons for a no-duty ruling and to 
protect the traditional function of the jury as factfinder.15 
While not relevant to the duty determination, foreseeability is 
relevant in determining breach.  Section 3 of the Third 
Restatement covering breach reads as follows: 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise 
reasonable care under all the circumstances.  Primary 
factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s 
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable 
likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, 
the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and 
the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk 
 
 15. Id. § 7 cmt. j. 
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of harm.16 
Section 8, governing the judge-jury relationship on the 
reasonable care (breach) issue, emphasizes that the breach issue is 
generally a question of fact for the jury: 
(a) When, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds 
can differ as to the facts relating to the actor’s conduct, it 
is the function of the jury to determine those facts. 
(b) When, in light of all the facts relating to the actor’s 
conduct, reasonable minds can differ as to whether the 
conduct lacks reasonable care, it is the function of the 
jury to make that determination.17 
The Third Restatement adopts a but-for standard for 
determining cause in fact.  Section 26 states that “[c]onduct is a 
factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred 
absent the conduct.”18  The Third Restatement rejects the 
substantial factor test in part because of the qualitative judgments it 
invites, even when factual cause is otherwise established.19 
Foreseeability is also absent from the scope of liability 
determination.  Section 29 limits an actor’s liability to “harms that 
result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”20  The 
Third Restatement rejects the term “proximate cause” to avoid 
confusion and to separate the scope of liability issue from factual 
cause.21  The Third Restatement takes the position that scope of 
liability issues are generally issues of fact for the factfinder to 
resolve.22  A foreseeability standard for resolving scope of liability 
issues is not inconsistent with the Third Restatement position, but 
the comments explain that the scope of liability standard is 
preferable because it is a clearer standard that will facilitate analysis 
in given cases and provides a better understanding of the reasons 
for the rule “by appealing to the intuition that it is fair for an 
actor’s liability to be limited to those risks that made the conduct 
wrongful.”23  As framed in one of the instructions suggested by the 
reporters for resolving scope of liability issues, a jury would be 
asked to determine “whether the plaintiff’s harm was of the same 
 
 16. Id. § 3. 
 17. Id. § 8. 
 18. Id. § 26. 
 19. Id. at cmt. j. 
 20. Id. § 29. 
 21. Id. at cmt. b. 
 22. Id. at cmt. f. 
 23. Id. at cmt. j. 
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general type of harm that the defendant should have acted to 
avoid.”24 
Intervening/superseding cause issues are folded into the scope 
of liability analysis.  In many jurisdictions, foreseeability is a 
component of the superseding cause determination.25  Section 34 
of the Third Restatement says that “[w]hen a force of nature or an 
independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an actor’s liability is 
limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the 
actor’s conduct tortious.”26  The advent of comparative fault and 
limitations on joint and several liability rules have undermined one 
of the primary justifications for superseding cause rules, which is to 
avoid imposing liability on a modestly negligent tortfeasor for the 
entire liability.27 
III. STATE APPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD RESTATEMENT 
State encounters with the Third Restatement approach to 
negligence cases have varied widely, from open acceptance to tight-
lipped rejection.  The Iowa Supreme Court accepted the Third 
Restatement’s approach to duty, scope of liability, and cause in 
fact.28  Relying on section 7 of the Third Restatement, the Arizona 
Supreme Court purged foreseeability from duty determinations.29  
Nebraska relied on the finally approved section 7 in doing the 
same.30  Wisconsin has not adopted section 7, but the supreme 
court has used the comments to support its conclusion that 
foreseeability is not part of the duty determination.31 
The Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the Third 
Restatement’s approach in section 37 for risk creation in a take-
home asbestosis case, but the court specifically decided that 
foreseeability is pivotal in the resolution of duty issues without 
directly considering section 7.32  Justice Holder’s dissenting 
 
 24. Id. at cmt. b reporters’ note. 
 25. Minnesota’s version is set out in Canada By & Through Landy v. McCarthy, 
567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn.1997). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
34 (2010). 
 27. Id. at cmt. a. 
 28. Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834–39 (Iowa 2009). 
 29. Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 231 (Ariz. 2007). 
 30. A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist., 784 N.W.2d 907, 914–18 (Neb. 2010). 
 31. Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568, 575–76 (Wis. 
2009). 
 32. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 362–63 (Tenn. 
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position, however, was that the Third Restatement’s approach 
should be followed and foreseeability should not be part of the 
duty consideration.33  Delaware considered but rejected the Third 
Restatement, also in a take-home asbestosis case.34  This section 
takes a close look at why the courts reached those conclusions. 
A. Iowa 
In Thompson v. Kaczinski,35 the Iowa Supreme Court specifically 
adopted the Third Restatement’s position on duty and scope of 
liability.36  Thompson, a minister, was driving down a rural gravel 
road in Iowa on a Sunday morning, traveling from one of his 
churches to another, when he swerved to avoid the top of a 
trampoline that wind gusts had blown from adjacent property onto 
the road.37  The residents who owned the trampoline had 
disassembled it a few weeks earlier but had failed to secure the 
top.38  Thompson lost control of his car and was injured in the 
ensuing accident.39  He and his wife brought suit against the owners 
of the trampoline.40  The defendants moved for summary judgment 
on the basis that the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs 
because the accident was unforeseeable.41  The trial court granted 
the motion.42  The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed.43 
On appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, the Thompsons argued 
that the trial court erred in holding that the defendants-appellees 
owed them no duty.  They relied on Iowa cases that established a 
statutory and common law duty of an owner of property adjacent to 
a roadway to use reasonable care not to obstruct the roadway.44  
The Thompsons then argued that the breach and proximate cause 
issues were for the jury.45  The brief for the defendants-appellees 
 
2008). 
 33. Id. at 375–77 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 34. Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20–21 (Del. 2009). 
 35. 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009). 
 36. Id. at 835–39. 
 37. Id. at 831. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 832. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Thompson v. Kaczinski, 760 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). 
 44. Appellants’ Brief at 10–14, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 
2009) (No. 08-0647). 
 45. Id. at 15–18. 
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argued that there was no duty as a matter of law.46  No 
foreseeability, no duty, no liability.47  Given the structure of the 
arguments, the Iowa Supreme Court could easily have decided the 
case based upon prevailing authority, but the court instead took 
advantage of the opportunity to clarify Iowa negligence law by 
adopting the Third Restatement approach. 
In deciding duty issues, the court noted that the Iowa cases 
have suggested that duty is a function of “the relationship between 
the parties,” “reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person who is 
injured,” and “public policy considerations.”48  The court viewed 
those factors as considerations in a balancing process rather than 
distinct and necessary elements in establishing duty.49 
The court accepted the Third Restatement’s view of duty and 
excised foreseeability from Iowa’s duty standards, leaving the issue 
to the trier of fact in connection with the breach issue, except in 
cases where the breach issue can be decided as a matter of law by 
the court.50  Tracking the Third Restatement’s reasons, the court 
concluded that the change would provide for more transparent 
duty determinations and better protect the traditional function of 
the jury as factfinder.51 
Removal of the foreseeability issue left only the question of 
whether “a principle or strong policy consideration” justified 
exempting the defendants “as part of a class of defendants-from the 
duty to exercise reasonable care.”52  The court concluded that there 
was no such principle that would justify refusing to impose a duty.53  
On the contrary, the court said, there is a public interest in keeping 
roadways clear of dangerous obstructions.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 46. Appellees’ Brief at 6–13, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 
2009) (No. 08-0647). 
 47. Id. at 11.  The primary case the appellees relied on was an Iowa Court of 
Appeals case, Bain v. Gillespie, 357 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). 
 48. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 834 (quoting Stotts v. Eveleth, 688 N.W.2d 803, 
810 (Iowa 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 835. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 835–36. 
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The trial court in the case also held that there was no causal 
connection between the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendants’ 
conduct as a matter of law because of the lack of foreseeability.55  As 
with the duty issue, the supreme court noted the uncertainty and 
confusion surrounding its proximate cause formulations.56 
Previous Iowa Supreme Court decisions had separated 
causation into two components: cause in fact and legal cause.57  The 
plaintiff was required to prove both.58  Cause in fact was determined 
by a but-for standard.59  Legal cause required a showing that a 
defendant’s negligent conduct was “a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm” and that “there is no rule of law relieving the actor 
from liability.”60 
In determining whether a defendant’s conduct is a substantial 
factor in causing the harm, the supreme court has “considered the 
proximity between the breach and the injury based largely on the 
concept of foreseeability.”61  “Substantial” expressed the idea that 
the “defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm 
as to lead reasonable minds to regard it as a cause.”62 
The Thompson court noted that one of the problems with the 
formulation had been inconsistency in its application and also 
confusion of factual determinations with policy judgments about 
the scope of liability.63  The court adopted the Third Restatement’s 
approach to scope of liability as a means of clarifying Iowa law, but 
in a way that it hoped would satisfactorily separate cause in fact 
from scope of liability while providing a manageable and 
understandable means of resolving scope of liability issues.64 
The court noted that “[t]he scope-of-liability issue is fact-
intensive as it requires consideration of the risks that made the 
 
 55. Id. at 836. 
 56. Id. at 836–37. 
 57. Id. at 836. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Yates v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 774 (Iowa 2006); Berte v. 
Bode, 692 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Iowa 2005); City of Cedar Falls v. Cedar Falls Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 617 N.W.2d 11, 17 (Iowa 2000). 
 60. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 836. 
 61. Id. (quoting Estate of Long ex rel. Smith v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 656 
N.W.2d 71, 83 (Iowa 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. Id. (quoting Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 836–37. 
 64. See id. at 837–38 (stating that resolving scope of liability issues no longer 
involves cause in fact determinations). 
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actor’s conduct tortious and a determination of whether the harm 
at issue is a result of any of those risks.”65  The supreme court noted 
that a court considering the scope of liability issue in a pretrial 
motion to dismiss will initially have to consider the full range of 
harms the defendant’s conduct risked and that a jury might find as 
a basis for determining the defendant’s conduct was tortious.66  
Then, “the court can compare the plaintiff’s harm with the range 
of harms risked by the defendant to determine whether a 
reasonable jury might find the former among the latter.”67 
The Thompson court did not specifically discuss the standard 
for determining cause in fact in routine negligence cases, but it has 
previously applied a but-for test to resolve that issue.68  The court 
did indicate approval of section 27 of the Third Restatement for 
resolving cases in which there are multiple sufficient causes.69  
 
 65. Id. at 838 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. E.g., Berte v. Bode, 692 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Iowa 2005). 
 69. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 837–38.  The Iowa Supreme Court has 
recognized that in addition to but-for causation, the plaintiff must establish that 
the risk is within the scope of the defendant’s liability and that the defendant’s 
conduct actually increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff.  Id. at 838.  In Royal 
Indemnity Co. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., 786 N.W.2d. 839 (Iowa 2010), the 
supreme court considered the scope of liability issue in a case involving a 
subrogated insurer’s claim for property damage due to fire against an insurer that 
allegedly failed to perform proper inspection of the property where the fire 
occurred.  While the case was tried before the supreme court’s decision in 
Thompson, the court applied the analysis under section 30 of the Third 
Restatement, with the understanding that its analysis would have been the same 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the court had previously 
adopted.  Id. at 849–50. 
  The fire resulted in the complete destruction of the warehouse inventory.  
Id. at 844.  On the day of the fire, the water pressure was insufficient to permit the 
fire department to extinguish the fire.  Id.  Neither the cause of the fire nor the 
origin of the inadequate water pressure was explained.  Id.  John Deere, the 
warehouse owner, argued that it would not have moved into the warehouse had 
Factory Mutual conducted a proper inspection.  Id. at 848.  In that sense, 
inadequate inspection was the but-for cause of the fire, but the court concluded 
that Factory Mutual’s conduct in no way increased the risk to John Deere because 
there was no showing that an inspection would have revealed problems with the 
water pressure or the source of the fire that caused the damage.  Id. at 851–52. 
  The supreme court applied section 30 of the Third Restatement, which 
provides that “[a]n actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the 
actor’s conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that 
harm.”  Id. at 850 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 (2010)).  The court found illustration one on point: 
Gordie is driving 35 miles per hour on a city street with a speed limit of 
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Section 27 provides that “[i]f multiple acts occur, each of which 
under section 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the 
physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), 
each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”70 
The court did not specifically consider the standards to be 
applied to the breach issue.  The Iowa pattern instruction on 
breach reads as follows: 
“Negligence” means failure to use ordinary care.  
Ordinary care is the care which a reasonably careful 
person would use under similar circumstances.  
“Negligence” is doing something a reasonably 
careful person would not do under similar 
circumstances, or failing to do something a 
reasonably careful person would do under similar 
circumstances.71 
The pattern instruction, like that in many other states, does 
not specifically instruct the jury to consider the foreseeability of the 
harm in determining whether the defendant was negligent, but it is 
implicit in the breach determination in any event.  While the Third 
Restatement frames the negligence issue in terms of a risk-benefit 
approach,72 it is “agnostic” on the issue of how juries should be 
instructed on that issue,73 a recognition of the fact that many 
jurisdictions instruct in terms similar to those used in the Iowa 
instruction. 
In the wake of Thompson, the Iowa State Bar Association 
amended its pattern negligence instructions.  At the time Thompson 
 
25 miles per hour with Nathan as his passenger.  Without warning, a tree 
crashes on Gordie’s car, injuring Nathan.  Gordie’s speeding is a factual 
cause of Nathan’s harm because, if Gordie had not been traveling at 35 
miles per hour, he would not have arrived at the location where the tree 
fell at the precise time that it fell.  Gordie is not liable to Nathan because 
Gordie’s speeding did not increase the risk of the type of harm suffered 
by Nathan.  The speeding merely put Gordie at the place and time at 
which the tree fell. This is true even if the type of harm suffered by 
Nathan might be found to be one of the risks arising from speeding in an 
automobile. 
Id. at 850–51 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 cmt. a, illus. 1 (2010)). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
27 (2010). 
 71. IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 700.2 (2008). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
3 cmt. e (2010). 
 73. Id. at cmt. d reporters’ note. 
  
1068 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
was decided the pattern instruction on proximate cause read as 
follows: 
700.3 Proximate Cause—Defined.  The conduct of a party 
is a proximate cause of damage when it is a substantial 
factor in producing damage and when the damage would 
not have happened except for the conduct. 
“Substantial” means the party’s conduct has such an effect 
in producing damage as to lead a reasonable person to 
regard it as a cause.74 
Post-Thompson, the amended instruction eliminated the word 
“proximate” from the heading and the body of the instruction to 
include only but-for causation: 
700.3 Cause—Defined 
The conduct of a party is a cause of damage when the 
damage would not have happened except for the 
conduct.75 
A new instruction was added for the resolution of scope of 
liability issues: 
700.3A Scope of Liability—Defined 
You must decide whether the claimed harm to plaintiff is 
within the scope of defendant’s liability.  The plaintiff’s 
claimed harm is within the scope of a defendant’s liability 
if that harm arises from the same general types of danger 
that the defendant should have taken reasonable steps [or 
other tort obligation] to avoid. 
Consider whether repetition of defendant’s conduct 
makes it more likely harm of the type plaintiff claims to 
have suffered would happen to another.  If not, the harm 
is not within the scope of liability.76 
The Iowa Supreme Court applied section 7’s categorical 
approach to duty in Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co.,77 a 
wrongful death take-home asbestos case.  The plaintiff, an 
employee of an independent contractor, did work over a period of 
years at the defendant’s power plant and was regularly exposed to 
asbestos during the course of his work.78  His wife contracted 
 
 74. IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 700.3 (2008). 
 75. IOWA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 700.3(A) (2010). 
 76. Id. § 700.3A.  The comment to the instruction notes that scope of liability 
will not be in issue in most cases and that the instruction should be given only in 
cases where there is a jury issue concerning scope of liability. Id. at cmt. 
 77. 777 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa 2009). 
 78. Id. at 692. 
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mesothelioma because of her regular exposure to asbestos dust 
while laundering his clothes.79  Noting section 7(b) of the Third 
Restatement, the court concluded that it was appropriate to modify 
the general duty of reasonable care by holding that an employer 
“owes no general duty of reasonable care to a member of the 
household of an employee of the independent contractor.”80 
B. Nebraska 
In A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 0001,81 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court adopted the Third Restatement position in making 
foreseeability an element of breach but not duty.82  The case arose 
out of a sexual assault of C.B., a kindergarten student at an 
elementary school, by an intruder during school hours.83  The 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 696.  In another case, Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Community School 
District, 788 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 2010), the supreme court applied the Third 
Restatement in a case involving the issue of a school district’s liability for failing to 
guard against an assault committed by a basketball player.  Brokaw was injured in a 
basketball game when a player with an opposing team hit him, causing a 
concussion.  Id. at 388.  Brokaw and his parents sued the player for assault and 
battery and the school district for negligent supervision of the player.  Id. at 388.  
The case was tried to the court, which found assault and battery, but that the 
school district could not reasonably foresee the attack by the player against 
Brokaw.  Id. at 387.  The supreme court affirmed.  Id. at 387–88.  While the case 
was decided before Thompson, the trial court considered the foreseeability issue in 
connection with the breach issue, so the supreme court thought it appropriate to 
analyze the case under the Third Restatement approach.  Id. at 391.  The court 
concluded that the result was consistent with the Third Restatement, sections 3 
and 19.  Id. at 391–93.  Section 19 provides that “[t]he conduct of a defendant can 
lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or permits the 
improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §19 (2010). 
  In a more recent case, Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2010), the 
supreme court declined to consider the application of the Third Restatement in a 
sports injury case in which a softball player’s released bat hit the first baseman 
during an intramural high school softball practice.  The case turned on the 
application of the contact-sports exception, which bars recovery for injury 
sustained during the course of a contact sport unless the injury is caused 
recklessly.  Id. at 77–78.  The parties in the case did not dispute the contact-sports 
exception, but only its application to softball.  Id. at 78.  The court held that the 
exception applied.  Id. at 79.  Three of the justices, Justices Wiggins, Appel, and 
Hecht, would have reached the issue of whether the contact sports exception is 
consistent with the Third Restatement.  See id. at 81 (Wiggins, J., concurring) 
(noting that the court should have addressed the issue now and avoided a terrible 
dilemma). 
 81. 784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010). 
 82. Id. at 918. 
 83. Id. at 911–13. 
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district court granted the school district’s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that the assault was not foreseeable.84 
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that the detailed, 
fact-specific analysis of the foreseeability of the injury in the case is 
typical of the no-duty determinations courts regularly reach in 
negligence cases.85  But the court concluded that it was just exactly 
that sort of analysis that justifies making the foreseeability issue the 
jury’s province in deciding breach, rather than the court’s, and in 
deciding whether there was a duty in the first place.86 
The court’s decision to purge foreseeability from the duty 
determination in Nebraska negligence cases was based primarily on 
two factors.  The first was that foreseeability determinations “are 
not particularly ‘legal,’ in the sense that they do not require special 
training, expertise, or instruction, nor do they require considering 
far-reaching policy concerns.”87  Foreseeability determinations 
involve the application of “common sense, common experience, 
and application of the standards and behavioral norms of the 
community—matters that have long been understood to be 
uniquely the province of the finder of fact.”88  The second was that 
purging foreseeability from duty would require courts to be clear in 
 
 84. Id. at 911. 
 85. See id. at 917. 
 86. Id.  The court summarized its observations: 
Under the Restatement (Third), foreseeable risk is an element in the 
determination of negligence, not legal duty.  In order to determine 
whether appropriate care was exercised, the fact finder must assess the 
foreseeable risk at the time of the defendant’s alleged negligence.  The 
extent of foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the case and 
cannot be usefully assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the 
facts may make a dramatic change in how much risk is foreseeable.  Thus, 
courts should leave such determinations to the trier of fact unless no 
reasonable person could differ on the matter.  And if the court takes the 
question of negligence away from the trier of fact because reasonable 
minds could not differ about whether an actor exercised reasonable care 
(for example, because the injury was not reasonably foreseeable), then 
the court’s decision merely reflects the one-sidedness of the facts bearing 
on negligence and should not be misrepresented or misunderstood as 
involving exemption from the ordinary duty of reasonable care. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmts. i–j (2010)). 
 87. Lancaster, 784 N.W.2d at 914 (citing W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging 
Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 799 (2005)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Cardi, supra note 85) (citing Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 288 
(Ariz. 2007)). 
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articulating the reasons for their no-duty determinations.89 
The court’s specific focus in A.W. was on the relationship of 
foreseeability to the duty determination, although the other 
elements of Nebraska negligence law are not inconsistent with the 
Third Restatement’s approach.90  Nebraska applies a but-for 
standard for determining causation,91 which is consistent with the 
Third Restatement’s approach to cause in fact.92  Proximate cause 
requires, in addition, that the injury be “the natural and probable 
result of the negligence,” and that there be no “efficient 
intervening cause.”93  That standard is not consistent with the Third 
Restatement’s approach to scope of liability issues and it fails to 
capture the essence of that inquiry.94 
C. Arizona 
In Gipson v. Kasey,95 the Arizona Supreme Court applied the 
Third Restatement approach in eliminating foreseeability from the 
duty determination.  The issue was whether a coworker of the 
decedent, who provided prescription drugs to the decedent’s 
girlfriend at an employee party, owed a duty of reasonable care to 
the decedent who took the pills and died from the combined 
toxicity of the pills and alcohol he had ingested throughout the 
course of the evening.96  Arizona adopts the standard four elements 
for negligence: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a 
certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that 
standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.”97 
 
 
 89. Id. at 917. 
 90. See id. at 917–18. 
 91. Zeller v. Howard Cnty., 419 N.W.2d 654, 671–72 (Neb. 1988). 
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. b (2010). 
 93. Malolepszy v. State, 729 N.W.2d 669, 675 (Neb. 2007); Willet v. Cnty. of 
Lancaster, 713 N.W.2d 483, 571 (Neb. 2006); Zeller, 419 N.W.2d at 672. 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 29 cmt. b reporters’ note (2010) (“‘Proximate cause’ is an old term with a 
murky history and a large amount of cumbersome baggage.  In the notes and 
questions in this book we try to avoid the term ‘proximate cause’ in favor of [using 
cause in fact and legal cause].” (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID W. 
ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 169 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 95. 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz. 2007). 
 96. Id. at 229–30. 
 97. Id. at 230 (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983)). 
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Although duty is a question of law for the court, the other 
elements are typically for the jury.98  Concerned that allowing 
courts to consider foreseeability as a threshold matter could 
undermine the jury’s fact-finding role and obscure other factors 
that should be considered in resolving duty issues, the court 
clarified Arizona law by expressly holding “that foreseeability is not 
a factor to be considered by courts when making determinations of 
duty.”99  In taking that position, the court relied on a law review 
article by Jonathan Cardi and one of the comments to section 7 of 
the then-proposed final draft section of the Third Restatement.100  
The court emphasized the distinction between the duty issue, 
which involves generalizations about categories of cases, and 
breach, which is fact-specific.101 
The supreme court noted that a duty could also “arise from 
special relationships based on contract, family relations, or conduct 
undertaken by the defendant,” but that making those sorts of 
determinations based upon a fact-specific analysis of the 
relationship between the parties is “a problematic basis for 
determining if a duty of care exists.”102  The dispute over the facts 
concerning the relationship between Kasey and the decedent 
prompted the court to conclude that no special relationship duty 
could be established.103 
Noting that duty does not necessarily turn on the existence of 
a preexisting or direct relationship between the parties, the court 
saw an erosion of formal relationship as a prerequisite for duty 
when public policy otherwise supports finding a duty.104  Kasey 
argued that imposing a duty on him would effectively mean that a 
duty would be imposed on all persons to exercise reasonable care 
for the protection of all other persons at all times, a result that he 
argued would be at odds with Arizona precedent.105 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 231. 
 100. Id. (citing Cardi, supra note 87, at 801; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2005)). 
 101. Gipson, 150 P.3d at 231. 
 102. Id. at 232. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 851–52 (Ariz. 2004)). 
 105. Id. at 233.  The court cited two court of appeals cases, both of which 
contained language supporting Kasey’s argument: Wertheim v. Pima County, 122 
P.3d 1, 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) and Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
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In response, the supreme court noted its own prior decisions 
recognizing that “every person is under a duty to avoid creating 
situations which pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others” and 
that the position taken in the Third Restatement is that duty 
generally exists when an actor creates a risk of physical harm, 
subject to policy exceptions.106  The court found it unnecessary to 
resolve the scope of duty issue, however, because it held that a duty 
existed based upon Arizona statutes criminalizing the distribution 
of prescription drugs to persons lacking a valid prescription.107 
While the supreme court jettisoned foreseeability as a factor in 
the duty determination, the court did say it is relevant to the 
breach and causation issues.108  As in Iowa and other states,109 
foreseeability is not a factor in the pattern instruction on 
negligence in Arizona: “Negligence is the failure to use reasonable 
care.  Negligence may consist of action or inaction.  Negligence is 
the failure to act as a reasonably careful person would act under 
the circumstances.”110  Nothing in the instruction impedes 
arguments on the foreseeability and other risk-benefit factors, of 
course. 
Foreseeability remains a factor in the causation analysis, 
however, when intervening/superseding cause issues are raised.111  
This injects some of the same potential confusion into the issue 
that the court avoided by removing foreseeability from the duty 
consideration.  The Third Restatement avoids the problem of 
foreseeability in intervening/superseding cause cases by simply 
folding the analysis into the scope of liability issue.112 
 
 
 106. Gipson, 150 P.3d at 233 n.4 (quoting Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 209 
(Ariz. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 107. Id. at 233–34. 
 108. Id. at 231. 
 109. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 110. REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) FAULT 1 (4th ed. Jan. 2005). 
 111. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. 
1990) (“A superseding cause, sufficient to become the proximate cause of the final 
result and relieve defendant of liability for his original negligence, arises only 
when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described, with the 
benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.” (citations omitted)). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
34 (2010). 
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D. Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the Third 
Restatement’s position on the role of foreseeability in negligence 
law in Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Insurance Co.113  Behrendt was 
injured while using a ten-year-old, custom-made tank fabricated by 
two employees of Silvan Industries, which was in the business of 
manufacturing pressure tanks.114  The employees did the work as a 
side job and favor to Behrendt’s employer, who needed a storage 
tank for use in his oil changing business.115  After the tank was 
fabricated, the plaintiff’s employer modified the oil collection 
system over a period of weeks, including plugging some holes in 
the side of the tank, fitting the tank with valves at the top and 
bottom to allow for the collection and drainage of oil, and adding a 
fitting for connection of an air hose to facilitate drainage of the 
tank.116  Behrendt was injured when the tank exploded while he was 
using it with air pressure.117 
He brought suit against Silvan, Gulf Underwriters and its 
insurer, and one of the Silvan employees who fabricated the tank.118  
Silvan and Gulf moved for summary judgment.119  The circuit court 
granted the motion “because the negligence was too remote from 
the injury and because allowing recovery would open the door to 
fraudulent claims and would have no sensible or just stopping 
point.”120  The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that any harm 
the employee caused was not foreseeable and that the “lack of 
foreseeability and absurdly attenuated chain of events . . . supports 
the circuit court’s ruling . . . .”121 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, but on the basis that 
Silvan did not breach its duty to Behrendt.122  The court noted that 
Wisconsin follows Judge Andrews’s view in Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad that “[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of 
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the 
 
 113. 768 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2009). 
 114. Id. at 571–72. 
 115. Id. at 571. 
 116. Id. at 571–72. 
 117. Id. at 572. 
 118. Behrendt v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 747 N.W.2d 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 572–73. 
 121. Behrendt, 747 N.W.2d at 527. 
 122. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 579–80. 
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safety of others.”123  The duty of ordinary care depends on what is 
reasonable under the circumstances.124  The majority opinion 
couched its analysis in terms of its recent case law on negligence in 
which it examined whether a defendant exercised reasonable care, 
instead of whether the defendant had a duty to a specific act.125 
While not adopting section 7 of the Third Restatement,126  the 
court in Behrendt found comments i and j to section 7 of the Third 
Restatement127 to be helpful in explaining the court’s position on 
the role of foreseeability in negligence law and in clearly 
distinguishing between the determinations for duty and breach.128  
Those comments state that while courts sometimes take cases away 
from juries on the basis of no duty due to a lack of foreseeability, 
what courts really are doing is ruling that there is no breach as a 
matter of law and that lack of foreseeability is not a basis for 
making a no duty determination.  The supreme court said that 
while language in some of if its prior opinions invoked 
foreseeability in connection with the duty issue, it found that the 
approach taken by the Third Restatement in those comments to be 
most consistent with the court’s approach to duty in the vast 
majority of its cases.129 
The court said that there are occasional “cases where a 
negligence claim fails because the duty of care does not encompass 
the acts or omissions that caused the harm, but this is not one of 
them.”130  Turning to the breach issue, the court emphasized that 
the issue is for the jury except in “rare” cases.131  The court held that 
 
 123. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., 
concurring); see also Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Wis. 2003) 
(“Wisconsin has long followed the minority view of duty set forth in the dissent of 
Palsgraf . . . .”). 
 124. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 574–75 (citing Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate 
Bank, 717 N.W.2d 17, 28–29 (Wis. 2006)). 
 125. Id. at 574 (quoting Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 913 (Wis. 
2000))(citing Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 746 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Wis. 2008)). 
 126. The court noted that its “long-standing practice has been to review and 
decide whether to adopt sections from the Restatements on a case-by-case basis as 
we deem it necessary” and that it has “previously noted, without finding it 
necessary to adopt, helpful language from sections in the Restatements where it 
provides further support for the rationale for a holding.”  Id. at 575 n.7 (citations 
omitted). 
 127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7 cmts. i–j (2010). 
 128. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 575–76. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 576. 
 131. Id. 
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Behrendt was such a case,132 emphasizing again the Third 
Restatement’s position in comment j to section 7 and finding no 
breach as a matter of law.133 
Although the supreme court determined that summary 
judgment was appropriately granted on the negligence issue, it 
nonetheless commented on other fact-dependent lines of analysis it 
had previously utilized, including determinations that a 
defendant’s duty “did not extend to the alleged acts or omissions” 
and that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff based upon 
public policy grounds.134  The court pointed out that Behrendt could 
have been legitimately resolved on public policy grounds.135  The 
court recognized six policy factors from past decisions: (1) 
remoteness of the injury from the negligence; (2) disproportion 
between the recovery and the tortfeasor’s negligence; (3) whether 
the harm is highly extraordinary as compared to the negligent act; 
(4) whether recovery would impose an unreasonable burden on 
the tortfeasor; (5) whether recovery would open the door to 
fraudulent claims; and (6) whether allowing recovery in the area 
would mean that there is no sensible or just stopping point.136 
The court found that remoteness would be a consideration, 
but having said that, the court reiterated its conclusion “that an 
analysis which clarifies that foreseeability is properly taken into 
consideration as to breach is the better approach here because it 
makes clear that we are not deviating from the Palsgraf minority 
position that we have adhered to in the vast majority of our 
cases.”137  Uncoupling foreseeability from the duty analysis resolves 
part of the problem under the Third Restatement view, but the 
Wisconsin approach still gives courts considerable latitude in 
applying a loose network of case-specific factors, rather than 
categorical considerations, in determining whether duty exists in a 
particular case.  To that extent, it is inconsistent with the Third 
Restatement’s approach to the duty issue.138 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 577. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  The policy factors were drawn from Colla v. Mandella, 85 N.W.2d 345, 
348 (Wis. 1957).  See also Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 158, 
169 (Wis. 2002). 
 137. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 578. 
 138. See Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver, the Violin, and the Scalpel: Duty and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23–24 (2008). 
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In lengthy dueling concurring opinions, Chief Justice 
Abrahamson and Justice Roggensack disagreed about the role of 
foreseeability in cases involving nonfeasance and, more broadly, 
about the role of duty in Wisconsin negligence law.139  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson disagreed with Justice Roggensack’s concurrence 
because it applied separate standards to misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.140  As she characterized Justice Roggensack’s 
approach, if the alleged negligence of a defendant is an omission, 
rather than an affirmative act, the court would first have to decide 
whether the defendant’s general duty to use reasonable and 
ordinary care implies a more specific duty to do an act that the 
defendant omitted.141  If the general duty does not imply a more 
specific duty to act, the defendant is not negligent as a matter of 
law.142  If the defendant acted affirmatively, the issue is simply 
whether the defendant acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.143 
In response, Justice Roggensack observed that in her opinion, 
Chief Justice Abrahamson took “the unusual tac[k] of attacking a 
concurring opinion in her ongoing mission of attempting to 
eliminate the element of duty from common law negligence claims 
in Wisconsin” and “in so doing, she only strengthens the black 
letter law that a negligence claim in Wisconsin has duty as an 
element.”144  She also disagreed with the Chief Justice’s “lament” 
that her analysis was inconsistent with Wisconsin case law, noting 
that the primary Wisconsin cases involving duty issues establish that 
“[d]uty remains a highly nuanced element of negligence; it has not 
been gobbled up by the dissenting opinion in Palsgraf.”145 
E. Tennessee 
Tennessee adheres to the view that foreseeability is an integral 
part of the duty determination.  The majority’s opinions in two 
cases, Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.146 and Giggers v. Memphis 
 
 139. Behrendt, 768 N.W.2d at 580–83 (Abrahamson, J., concurring); id. at 589–
595 (Roggensack, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 581. 
 141. Id. at 580. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 580–81. 
 144. Id. at 594 (citations omitted). 
 145. Id. 
 146. 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). 
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Housing Authority,147 establish the intensively fact-specific analysis 
necessary in a duty analysis under Tennessee law.  Justice Holder 
has been alone in consistently urging the adoption of the Third 
Restatement position on duty, however.  Her views are established 
in two concurring and dissenting opinions, one involving a take-
home asbestos case and the other the failure of a Housing 
Authority to prevent a shooting.148 
Satterfield concerned the liability of an employer for the death 
from mesothelioma of an employee’s daughter because of her 
repeated exposure to asbestos-contaminated work clothing he wore 
home from work.149  The suit alleged that the employer was 
negligent in permitting him to wear the work clothing home.150  
The supreme court held that the employer owed a duty to the 
daughter.151  As framed by the court,  
[t]he underlying dispute . . . is fundamentally one of 
characterization and classification.  Has Alcoa engaged in 
an affirmative act that created an unreasonable and 
foreseeable risk of harm to Ms. Satterfield?  If Alcoa did 
create such a risk of harm, are there countervailing legal 
principles or policy considerations that warrant 
determining that Alcoa nevertheless owed no duty [to] 
Ms. Satterfield?  Or, alternatively, does this case involve an 
omission by Alcoa in failing to control the actions of Mr. 
Satterfield, its employee?  If so, then does Alcoa have the 
sort of special relationship with either Mr. Satterfield or 
Ms. Satterfield that gives rise to a duty to restrain Mr. 
Satterfield or to protect Ms. Satterfield?  The answers to 
these questions emerge from considerations of precedent 
and public policy, as well as the basic foundations of 
Tennessee’s tort law.152 
 
 
 
 147. 277 S.W.3d 359 (Tenn. 2009). 
 148. See id. at 372 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting); Satterfield, 266 
S.W.3d at 375 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 149. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351–52. 
 150. Id. at 351. 
 151. Id. at 352 (“[U]nder the facts alleged in the complaint, the employer 
owed a duty to those who regularly and for extended periods of time came into 
close contact with the asbestos-contaminated work clothes of its employees to 
prevent them from being exposed to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of 
harm.”). 
 152. Id. at 355. 
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Before concluding that the special relationship issue was 
irrelevant because Alcoa affirmatively created a risk of injury,153 the 
court spent a substantial amount of time analyzing the distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance and the importance of 
establishing a special relationship in cases involving nonfeasance.154  
The court relied in part on section 37 of the Third Restatement in 
so characterizing Alcoa’s conduct.155  Following section 37, the 
court concluded that the important factor was not the relationship 
between the parties but conduct creating a risk.156 
Finding the creation of the risk insufficient by itself to establish 
a duty,157 however, the court proceeded to consider in detail the 
issue of whether Alcoa owed a duty to Ms. Satterfield.158  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s conception of duty as an expression of 
public policy involves a consideration of a variety of factors: 
(1) the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury 
occurring; (2) the possible magnitude of the potential 
harm or injury; (3) the importance or social value of the 
activity engaged in by the defendant; (4) the usefulness of 
the conduct to the defendant; (5) the feasibility of 
alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative costs and 
burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the 
relative usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the 
relative safety of alternative conduct.159 
Keeping the list “firmly in mind,” said the court, “Tennessee’s 
courts use a balancing approach to determine whether the 
particular risk should give rise to a duty of reasonable care.”160 
Under the Tennessee approach “duty arises when the degree 
of foreseeability of the risk and the gravity of the harm outweigh 
the burden that would be imposed  if the defendant were required 
to engage in an alternative course of conduct that would have 
 
 153. Id. at 364. 
 154. Id. at 355–61. 
 155. Id. at 356–57. nn. 8, 10–11. 
 156. Id. at 362–63. 
 157. Id. at 364. 
 158. Id. at 364–69. 
 159. Id. at 365. 
 160. Id.  Some of these factors are factors for consideration by the trier of fact 
in deciding the breach issue in the Third Restatement view.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010) (factors to 
consider on the breach issue include “the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s 
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, 
and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm”). 
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prevented the harm.”161  The foreseeability and gravity of the harm 
are connected.  The degree of foreseeability necessary for duty is 
inversely proportional to the magnitude of the foreseeable harm.162  
Finally, Tennessee courts are permitted “to consider the 
contemporary values of Tennessee’s citizens.”163 
Lest this all seem rather amorphous, the court said in its 
introduction to the duty analysis that “[i]t would be erroneous . . . 
to assume that the concept of duty is a freefloating application of 
public policy, drifting on the prevailing winds like the seeds of a 
dandelion.”164  The court then said, reassuringly, and mixing 
metaphors, that the courts in Tennessee “have not become so 
intoxicated on the liquor of public policy analysis” that they have 
lost their “appreciation for the moderating and sobering influences 
of the well-tested principles regarding the imposition of duty.”165 
Foreseeability is a factor of paramount importance in the duty 
determination.166  The court carefully evaluated the role of 
foreseeability in negligence cases, concluding that while there are 
difficulties with it, “the experience of most courts has been that 
maintaining a role for foreseeability when addressing questions 
regarding the existence and scope of duty assists—more than it 
impedes—the application and development of the law of 
negligence.”167 
Foreseeability is important in determining whether there is a 
serious enough probability or likelihood of harm that would 
prompt a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid the 
harm.168  The court had no problem in concluding that the harm to 
Ms. Satterfield was foreseeable.169  Having done so, the court 
proceeded to consider the balancing factors, but with the 
cautionary note that courts should be careful not to invade the 
province of the jury in performing their gatekeeping function.170 
 
 
 
 161. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 366. 
 164. Id. at 365. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 366. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 367. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 367–68. 
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After disposing of additional policy arguments by Alcoa 
emphasizing the adverse impact of a decision imposing a duty in 
take-home exposure cases,171 and considering and rejecting adverse 
authority from other jurisdictions,172 the court concluded that the 
duty it recognized “extends to those who regularly and repeatedly 
come into close contact with an employee’s contaminated work 
clothes over an extended period of time, regardless of whether they 
live in the employee’s home or are a family member.”173 
Justice Holder, concurring and dissenting, agreed with the 
majority that Alcoa owed Ms. Satterfield a duty to use reasonable 
care to prevent her from injury because of risks created at Alcoa’s 
facility.174  She wrote separately to emphasize her belief that 
foreseeability plays no role in deciding the duty issue but is more 
appropriately reserved for the breach of duty or proximate cause 
determinations.175 
In her opinion, the relationship of the parties is relevant only 
in cases involving nonfeasance.176  Her reasons are the standard 
ones.  Foreseeability is an issue more properly reserved for the jury.  
Incorporation of foreseeability in the duty determination expands 
the authority of judges at the expense of juries.  Leave it to the jury, 
because “[a] collection of twelve people representing a cross-
section of the public is better suited than any judge to make the 
common-sense and experience-based judgment of foreseeability.”177  
In addition, she takes the position that “reliance on foreseeability 
reduces the clarity and certainty of negligence law and gives judges 
such broad discretion that similarly situated parties may often be 
treated differently,” and that the use of foreseeability may actually 
obscure the policy considerations that motivate courts’ duty 
decisions.178 
The disagreement was replayed in Giggers v. Memphis Housing 
Authority,179 a wrongful death action against the Housing Authority 
for negligently failing to prevent the shooting death of one tenant 
 
 171. Id. at 369–72. 
 172. Id. at 371–73. 
 173. Id. at 374. 
 174. Id. (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 375–76. 
 176. Id. at 375. 
 177. Id. at 376 (citing Cardi, supra note 87, at 799–800). 
 178. Id. at 378 (citing Cardi, supra note 87 at 740–41, 792–93). 
 179. 277 S.W.3d 359 (Tenn. 2009). 
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by another.180  The court classified the case as one of nonfeasance, 
but concluded that the landlord-tenant relationship is a special 
relationship that imposes on landlords an obligation to use 
reasonable care for the protection of their tenants against 
unreasonable risks of foreseeable harms.181  The court first 
considered whether the risk was foreseeable and then applied a 
balancing test to determine whether the risk was unreasonable.182 
The court first concluded that the Housing Authority’s general 
knowledge of criminal activity in the housing project, along with its 
particular knowledge of the shooter’s prior altercation with 
another tenant, justified a conclusion that the authority could 
reasonably have foreseen the probability of another violent 
attack.183  The first of the balancing factors, specific foreseeability, 
was established because of the authority’s knowledge of the 
shooter’s prior conduct.184  The second factor, magnitude of the 
harm, also supported the existence of a duty because of the prior 
violent threats.185  The third factor, the social value of public 
housing, favored the authority.186  The court found the fourth 
factor, the usefulness of stricter, alternative conduct, to be 
neutral.187  The fifth factor, the feasibility of safer, alternative 
conduct, favored by a small margin the imposition of a duty on the 
authority because simply evicting the shooter after his prior attack 
on a tenant would have been feasible.188  The court found that the 
sixth factor, the costs and burdens of safer conduct, favored the 
plaintiffs, but that because of the range of options available to the 
Housing Authority, the factor favored submission of the liability 
issue to the jury.189  Factors seven and eight, the usefulness and 
safety of the alternative conduct, did not cut one way or the other, 
in the court’s opinion.190  The facts show that while evicting tenants 
after violent confrontations could increase the safety of other 
tenants, it might simply transport the risk from one venue to 
 
 180. Id. at 360. 
 181. Id. at 364–65, 71. 
 182. Id. at 366–71. 
 183. Id. at 366–67. 
 184. Id. at 367. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 367–68. 
 187. Id. at 369. 
 188. Id. at 370. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 370–71. 
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another.191  The need for safety and the need to provide housing 
for low-income tenants are competing forces.192  The court 
concluded that on balance, closer monitoring of tenants with prior 
criminal records or using a recertification or other process did not 
appear to be overly burdensome.193 
In explaining its conclusion on the duty issue, the court 
emphasized that the defendant’s conduct has to create a 
recognizable risk, either to a plaintiff or a class of persons, which 
would include the tenants of an apartment building.194  Viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court 
concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the tenants of the 
apartments would be exposed to the risk of violent attacks and that 
the authority failed to offer an explanation as to why imposition of 
a duty would have an impermissible impact on the authority’s 
ability to provide low-income tenants affordable housing.195 
Justice Holder again concurred and dissented.196  She 
concurred in the court’s conclusion that the Housing Authority 
owed a duty to its tenants to take reasonable measures to prevent 
them from suffering harm, but she disagreed with the court’s 
approach to the duty issue.197  Without a discussion of the 
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, she concluded that the Third 
Restatement’s approach to the duty issue should be followed.198  
The issue of whether it was foreseeable to the Housing Authority 
that the shooter would harm other tenants should be relevant only 
to the breach and proximate cause issues, in her opinion.199  In her 
view, the majority’s balancing test incorporating foreseeability 
obscured the policy determinations relevant to the duty decision.200 
 
 
 
 191. Id. at 370–71. 
 192. Id. at 371. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 372 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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F.  Delaware 
In Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc.,201 the Delaware Supreme Court 
considered the same take-home asbestos issue as in Satterfield v. 
Breeding Insulation Co.  The plaintiff, wife of an employee of the 
defendant, alleged that she contracted asbestosis as a result of her 
exposure to asbestos fibers and dust on her husband’s clothing.202  
The superior court granted the employer’s motion for summary 
judgment and the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.203  There 
was no mention of the Third Restatement in the parties’ initial 
briefs in Riedel; but because Satterfield was decided on the eve of the 
oral argument and because the court in Satterfield considered and 
applied the Third Restatement, at least in part, in a similar case, 
the supreme court in Riedel asked the parties for supplemental 
briefs on the issue of whether it should adopt certain provisions of 
the Third Restatement, and if so, how those provisions should 
apply to the case.204 
The plaintiff-appellant in Riedel argued that the court should 
adopt sections 6, 7, 37, and 38 of the Third Restatement, 
attempting to persuade the court that the defendant affirmatively 
created a risk of injury, which would take the case out of the 
nonfeasance category and avoid any need to argue that a special 
relationship existed between the defendant and plaintiff.  Plaintiff-
appellant also argued that acceptance of the Third Restatement 
positions would be consistent with Delaware law.205  The defendant-
 
 201. 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009). 
 202. Id. at 18. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 20.  The first question was whether the supreme court should 
adopt certain provisions of the Third Restatement as the principles of law that 
should govern the case.  See id.  The court specifically asked about: sections 6 
(Liability for Negligence Causing Physical Harm); 7 (Duty); 37 (No Duty of Care 
with Respect to Risks Not Created by Actor); 38 (Duty Based on Prior Conduct 
Creating a Risk of Physical Harm); 39 (Duty Based on Prior Conduct Creating a 
Risk of Physical Harm Duty to Third Persons Based on Special Relationship with 
Person Posing Risks); 40 (Duty Based on Special Relationship with Another); and 
41 (Duty to Third Persons Based on Special Relationship with Person Posing 
Risks).  Id. at 20 n.8.  Assuming the adoption of the Third Restatement provisions, 
the second question the court asked was regarding the parties’ views about the 
application of those provisions.  Id.  Assuming that there should be “a duty of 
some scope under Section 6,” the court asked whether there is a “countervailing 
principle of policy” that the court should apply to the case or whether the court 
should defer to the legislature.  Id. 
 205. See Appellant Lillian Riedel’s Supplemental Reply Brief at 2, Riedel v. ICI 
Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009) (No. 156), 2008 WL 5069609, at *2. 
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appellee argued that adoption of the Third Restatement provisions 
would be a radical departure from long-established principles of 
Delaware tort law governing personal injury and property damage 
cases; that at the time no jurisdiction had adopted the Third 
Restatement’s duty framework, including the court’s decision in 
Satterfield; and that adoption of the Third Restatement’s duty 
concept “would open the floodgates of plaintiffs’ suits in the 
already expansive Delaware Asbestos Litigation and diminish the 
Superior Court’s control over its own docket.”206  The court 
summarized the plaintiff’s argument by stating that “[t]here simply 
is no sound reason to abandon the duty analysis utilized for 
decades by Delaware courts, which requires that some legally 
significant relationship exist between the parties for a duty of care 
to flow between them, in favor of the Third Restatement’s novel, 
untested and impractical approach.”207 
The supreme court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as one of 
misfeasance as to the defendant’s actions with respect to her 
husband, but one of nonfeasance in her own claim against the 
defendant, and held that the plaintiff was locked into her 
nonfeasance theory as alleged and argued in the trial court.208  The 
court held that she was not entitled to raise the misfeasance issue 
on appeal without having raised it in the trial court.209 
The court also declined to adopt any of the provisions of the 
Third Restatement.210  The court concluded that the Third 
Restatement redefined the duty concept “in a way that is 
inconsistent with th[e] Court’s precedents and traditions.”211  The 
court perceived the Third Restatement as creating duties in areas 
of the law where the court previously found no duty and deferred 
to the legislature as to whether a duty should be created.212  As an 
example—in fact, the only example—the court pointed out the 
Third Restatement’s discussion of the duties of tavern owners and 
social hosts who negligently provided alcohol to patrons or guests 
 
 206. Supplemental Answering Brief of Defendant-Below, Appellee ICI 
Americas Inc. at 2, Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009) (No. 156), 
2008 WL 5069608, at *2. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Riedel, 968 A.2d at 23–24. 
 209. Id. at 19, 23–25. 
 210. Id. at 20. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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who then injured third parties.213 
The comments to section 7 of the Third Restatement covering 
duty recognize that many courts, while holding that commercial 
sellers of alcohol have a duty to avoid injury to others caused by 
providing alcohol to guests, do not impose the same duty on social 
hosts for injuries caused by their intoxicated guests, justifying the 
result by reference to prevailing social norms about responsibility.214  
The comments make it clear that the Third Restatement neither 
endorses nor rejects that set of rules, but that “[i]t does support a 
court’s deciding this issue as a categorical matter under the rubric 
of duty, and a court’s articulating general social norms of 
responsibility as the basis for this determination.”215 
The supreme court in Riedel noted that for the past twenty-five 
years, it has taken the position that the issue of dram shop liability 
is a social policy issue for the legislature.216  Given its history of 
deference to the legislative distaste for dram shop liability, the 
court said it would be incongruous for the court to adopt the Third 
Restatement, “thereby creating a common law duty that directly 
contravenes the primacy of the legislative branch in resolving this 
question.”217  The court’s concern about the impact the Third 
Restatement would have on dram shop liability seemed to have 
driven its decision on the take-home asbestos issue, even though 
adopting the Third Restatement’s approach to duty would not have 
required acceptance of the Third Restatement comments.  In any 
event, it seems clear that the relevant Third Restatement comment 
does not take the position that a court should adopt social host 
liability, but only the position that the issue could be decided as a 
categorical matter and that general social norms could be the basis 
for finding such a duty. 
G. Summary 
The acceptance of the Third Restatement by the courts that 
have considered it to date has been varied, as would be expected.  
Four of the six state supreme courts that have considered it 
accepted the separation of foreseeability from the duty 
 
 213. See id. at 20–21. 
 214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7 cmts. a, c (2010). 
 215. Id. § 7 cmt. c. 
 216. Riedel, 968 A.2d at 21. 
 217. Id. 
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determination, although doing so does not mean acceptance of the 
Third Restatement’s “categorical” approach to duty in section 7(b).  
Courts may decide to eliminate foreseeability from the duty 
determination, but they may prefer to continue to apply a 
multifactor duty analysis because of the flexibility it gives them in 
making policy judgments.  Or they may eliminate foreseeability 
from duty but continue to make it a factor in proximate cause 
determinations.  The cautious approach is understandable, but it is 
also important to understand that the approach to negligence in 
the Third Restatement is not significantly different from that in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and that it is arguable that adoption 
of the Third Restatement would not result in any significant change 
in outcome in most cases.218 
Thompson v. Kaczinski reshaped Iowa negligence law in the 
vision of the Third Restatement.  It will change the way lawyers and 
judges approach cases.  The briefs in Thompson are a good 
indicator.  No one would have expected the lawyers in the case to 
brief and argue the impact of the Third Restatement, and the 
supreme court did not indicate to the lawyers its intent to consider 
the application of the Third Restatement, at least prior to oral 
argument.219 
The appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that 
the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, relying on Iowa cases 
establishing a statutory and common law duty of owners of property 
adjacent to roadways to use reasonable care not to obstruct the 
roadway,220 and that the breach and proximate cause issues were for 
the jury.221  The brief for the appellees focused on standard legal 
arguments: that there was no duty as a matter of law, no 
foreseeability, no duty, and no liability.222  Given the structure of the 
arguments, the Iowa Supreme Court could easily have decided the 
 
 218. See Cardi, supra note 87, at 804–08; W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. 
Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 691–95 (2008). 
 219. See Appellants’ Brief, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 
2009) (No. 08-0647); Appellees’ Brief, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 
(Iowa 2009) (No. 08-0647). 
 220. Appellants’ Brief at 10–14, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 
2009) (No. 08-0647). 
 221. Id. at 15–18. 
 222. Appellees’ Brief, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009) 
(No. 08-0647).  The primary case the Appellees relied on was an Iowa Court of 
Appeals case, Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).  See 
Appellees’ Brief at 7–8, Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009) (No. 
08-0647). 
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case based upon prevailing authority, but the court took advantage 
of the opportunity to clarify negligence law by adopting the Third 
Restatement approach. 
The Iowa bar quickly adapted to the change.  The Iowa State 
Bar Association adopted new jury instructions intended to 
implement Thompson’s approach with simple instructions on but-for 
causation and scope of liability.223  The court’s demonstrated 
approach to duty still gives it latitude to make judgments about 
duty on a categorical basis, just not on the basis of a lack of 
foreseeability.  Even focusing on breach, courts still have the 
obvious authority to determine in appropriate cases that there is no 
negligence as a matter of law.224  Iowa’s experience establishes that 
adoption of the Third Restatement will not result in radical 
changes in the law, and although there is likely to be argument on 
this, the court’s subsequent decisions applying Thompson on the 
duty issue have been doctrinally clear. 
At the other extreme, Tennessee’s failure to embrace the 
Third Restatement’s position on duty and foreseeability and 
Delaware’s rejection of the Third Restatement are understandable.  
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s fact-intensive analysis of the duty 
issues in Satterfield and Griggs illustrates the court’s commitment to 
its traditional duty analysis, but it also highlights the need to 
simplify the duty determination, as Justice Holder pointed out in 
her opinions in the cases.225  The Delaware Supreme Court in Riedel 
was obviously concerned that adoption of the Third Restatement’s 
position on duty would establish a precedent that would not only 
extend liability in asbestosis cases, but also that it would give 
Delaware courts inappropriate latitude to decide duty issues in a 
way that would conflict with the state’s traditions and history. 
Other decisions in between have accepted the common sense 
approach of separating foreseeability from duty, recognizing that 
the fact-intensive nature of the foreseeability analysis makes the 
 
 223. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Mitchell v. Hess, No. 08-C-847, 2010 WL 1212080, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
23, 2010).  Following Behrendt, the court noted that in rare cases the court can 
hold that there is no breach of duty as a matter of law because of the 
unforeseeability of the plaintiff’s injury.  The court held that Mitchell was such a 
case and held that the Boy Scouts of America Council could not be held liable for 
a ski accident that occurred during the course of a boy scout troop outing.  Id. 
 225. Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 371–72 (Tenn. 2009) 
(Holder, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 
266 S.W.3d 347, 375–77 (Tenn. 2008) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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issue appropriate for resolution by juries rather than courts.  The 
approach clarifies in one important respect the judge-jury 
relationship.  Along the way, it will avoid some of the 
inconsistencies inherent in case-by-case foreseeability 
determinations by the courts. 
IV. MINNESOTA NEGLIGENCE LAW 
There are four basic elements in a negligence case in 
Minnesota: duty, breach of duty, injury, and proximate cause.226  In 
applying the elements, courts in Minnesota have traditionally acted 
as gatekeepers as they screen cases to determine whether the 
injuries were sufficiently foreseeable to create a jury issue.227  Courts 
may hold as a matter of law that there is no duty because the risk 
created by the defendant’s conduct was not foreseeable as a matter 
of law.228  Even if there is a duty, primary assumption of risk may be 
applied to bar recovery.229  
Foreseeability is also often noted as a factor in determining 
whether a defendant’s negligence is the proximate cause of a 
particular injury,230 although proximate cause in Minnesota 
parlance is sometimes reduced to just the substantial factor test 
through the conflation of cause in fact and proximate cause 
standards.231  Foreseeability also relates to the breach issue232—
although decisions holding that there is no breach as a matter of 
law are less common, a reflection perhaps of the general 
understanding that the breach issue is quintessentially a jury 
 
 226. E.g., Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002); Louis v. 
Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001); Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 
401 (Minn. 1995); Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 
1982); Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells, 243 Minn. 289, 292, 67 
N.W.2d 644, 646 (1954). 
 227. E.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See generally Michael K. Steenson, The Role of Primary Assumption of Risk in 
Civil Litigation in Minnesota, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 115 (2003) [hereinafter 
Steenson, Role of Primary Assumption of Risk].  Courts also limit liability in cases 
where a danger is obvious, particularly in cases involving landowners’ duties cases.  
See generally Mike Steenson, Peterson v. Balach, Obvious Dangers, and the Duty of 
Possessors of Land in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1281 (2008). 
 230. E.g., Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 2006). 
 231. See, e.g., id. (citing Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 506 
(Minn. 1997)). 
 232. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 175 n.7, 199 N.W.2d 639, 648 n.7 
(1972) (listing foreseeability among factors to consider in determining landowner 
liability). 
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question.233  Cause in fact is generally, but not universally, framed in 
terms of the substantial factor standard rather than the but-for 
standard,234 although the but-for standard is routinely used in 
professional liability cases.235 
While the basic elements of a negligence claim have not 
changed, Minnesota negligence law today does not look exactly the 
same way it looked at the turn of or even the middle of the 
twentieth century.236  As the supreme court has noted, the common 
law in Minnesota “is the result of accumulated experience”237 
and”[i]t is composed of rules carefully crafted both to reflect our 
traditions as a state and to address emerging societal needs.”238  
Sometimes the court’s decisions are responsive to changing social 
conditions239 and sometimes perhaps the result of unintended turns 
in the law.240  The cumulative result is a legal culture in which 
courts have significant power as gatekeepers to determine which 
negligence cases are appropriate for jury resolution and which will 
fail for lack of a duty or proximate cause.241  Foreseeability plays a 
dominant role in those decisions. 
 
 233. Hedlund v. Hedlund, 371 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(“[Q]uestions of [breach] are usually inappropriate for summary judgment, since 
standards of reasonableness and causation are uniquely jury functions.”).  Courts 
do sometimes find no breach as a matter of law, however, based upon the lack of 
foreseeability of an injury.  E.g., Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 
152 N.W.2d 136, 138 (1967) (holding no negligence as a matter of law because 
tenant could not foresee injury to maintenance person). 
 234. BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA PRAC. BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 33:1 (2009–
2010 ed.). 
 235. See 4A MINN. PRACTICE SERIES, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 80 
Introductory Note (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, 5th ed. 2006). 
 236. See generally Mike Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, 33 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 239 (2006) (describing the evolution of the common law of 
torts in Minnesota as it has been structured by the Minnesota Supreme Court and 
modifications of the common law of torts by the Minnesota State Legislature). 
 237. Vaughn v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 1997). 
 238. Id. (holding that an airline owed a duty to a disabled passenger to assist 
passenger with luggage). 
 239. E.g., Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (“We are 
aware that courts should not shirk their duty to overturn unsound precedent and 
should strive continually to develop the common law in accordance with our own 
changing society.”). 
 240. See generally Steenson, The Character of the Minnesota Tort System, supra note 
236. 
 241. Even assuming the existence of a duty, courts regularly conclude that 
claims fail on the basis of primary assumption of risk.  See generally Steenson, Role of 
Primary Assumption of Risk, supra note 229. 
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A. Duty 
Sometimes duty determinations are made on a categorical 
basis, as when the supreme court determined that bystanders are 
not entitled to recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress,242 recognized a claim for negligent credentialing of a 
physician,243 or held that a physician’s liability for negligent genetic 
counseling extends to a child’s parents.244  Duty determinations may 
also turn on the foreseeability or risk of injury.  One might look at 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent decision in Foss v. Kincade,245 
for example, and conclude that objective foreseeability of a specific 
injury is a predicate to a finding of duty.  For the most part, it 
would be an accurate depiction of Minnesota law, although the 
story of how the law came to this point is complicated and cautions 
against automatic assumptions about the relationship between 
foreseeability and duty. 
Over a century ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court worked out 
its basic theory of negligence, including the role of duty, in the 
long privity shadow of Winterbottom v. Wright.246  In Moon v. Northern 
Pacific Railroad Co.,247 a late nineteenth century Minnesota Supreme 
Court case, the plaintiff’s decedent, a brakeman employed by the 
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Company, was killed while he was 
attempting to set a brake on a loaded freight car of the defendant, 
Northern Pacific.248  The car had been transferred by Northern 
Pacific to the decedent’s employer pursuant to a traffic 
arrangement.249  The plaintiff brought suit against both railroads 
but received a verdict only as to Northern Pacific.250  The issue was 
whether the relationship of the decedent to Northern Pacific was 
sufficient to impose a duty on that defendant to exercise 
reasonable care for the safety of the decedent.251 
While company rules required Northern Pacific to inspect the 
cars delivered to it by Manitoba, the court noted that the duty was 
not owed to the company alone, but that Northern Pacific had the 
 
 242. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554–55 (Minn. 1980).  
 243. Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 313 (Minn. 2007). 
 244. See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2004). 
 245. 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
 246. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.). 
 247. 46 Minn. 106, 48 N.W. 679 (1891). 
 248. Id. at 107, 48 N.W. at 679. 
 249. Id., 48 N.W. at 679. 
 250. Id. at 108, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 251. Id., 48 N.W. at 680. 
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primary duty to ensure the safety of the cars for the protection of 
Manitoba employees.252  Neither company would be obligated to 
draw the cars of the other over its line.253  The court noted that the 
duty was also owed to the servants who would have to handle the 
cars and who would be exposed to danger arising from the unsafe 
or defective condition of the cars.254  The court explained that one 
may owe two duties with respect to the same thing, “one of a special 
character to one person, growing out of special relations to him; 
and another of a general character, to those who would necessarily 
be exposed to risk and danger from the negligent discharge of such 
duty.”255 
The court also noted that any negligence on the part of 
Manitoba would not excuse negligence on the part of Northern 
Pacific.256  Neither company could excuse its liability because of the 
default of the other.257 
The duty owed was one of reasonable care.  Relying in part on 
Heaven v. Pender,258 the court stated the following: 
Subject to proper limitations, the rule generally stated is 
that if a reasonable man must see that, if he did not use 
due care in the circumstances, he might cause injury to 
the person or property of another entitled to repose 
confidence in his diligence, a duty arises to use such 
care.259 
Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co.,260 established that duty 
is relational.261  The plaintiff’s decedent was killed in an accident in 
the defendant’s yard, after the decedent had quit his job at the 
railroad earlier that day.262  He was trespassing in the yard when he 
was hit by railroad cars which then dragged him along to an 
improperly blocked switch.263  The court held that he was a 
trespasser and that the defendant owed him no duty.264  Duty was 
 
 252. Id. at 108–09, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 253. Id. at 108, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 254. Id. at 109, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 255. Id., 48 N.W. at 680. 
 256. Id. at 110, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 257. Id. at 110, 48 N.W. at 681. 
 258. (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng.). 
 259. Moon, 46 Minn. at 109, 48 N.W. at 680. 
 260. 58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669 (1894). 
 261. See id. at 544, 60 N.W. at 670. 
 262. Id. at 543, 60 N.W. at 670. 
 263. Id. at 544, 60 N.W. at 670. 
 264. Id., 60 N.W. at 670. 
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specific to the injured person: 
Actionable negligence is the failure to discharge a legal 
duty to the person injured.  If there is no duty, there is no 
negligence.  Even if a defendant owes a duty to some one 
else, but does not owe it to the person injured, no action 
will lie.  The duty must be due to the person injured.  
These principles are elementary, and are equally 
applicable whether the duty is imposed by positive statute 
or is founded on general common-law principles.265 
In the 1892 case of Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co.,266 a seminal 
products liability case in Minnesota and nationally, the court took 
the position that a seller furnishing a dangerous instrumentality 
with knowledge of the defects and knowledge that such defects 
would not be discovered is subject to liability without regard to 
privity.267 
In O’Brien v. American Bridge Co.268—a case decided eighteen 
years after Schubert in a didactic opinion by Justice Jaggard—the 
plaintiff and others were injured when a bridge collapsed as they 
were traveling over it.269  The defendant was responsible for the 
construction of the bridge pursuant to a contract with the county.270  
The county was responsible for the construction of the approaches 
to the bridge and connecting the bridge to the approaches.271 
The case presented potential problems because the bridge 
company contracted with the county and not the injured plaintiff.272  
On the other hand, the potential danger of a defective bridge 
could make any potential contract limitation irrelevant.  
Notwithstanding the court’s earlier decision in Schubert, the court 
was still concerned about the potential for contract law to frame 
tort remedies.273 
 
 
 
 
 265. Id., 60 N.W. at 670. 
 266. 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892). 
 267. Id. at 336, 51 N.W. at 1104. 
 268. 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910). 
 269. Id. at 366, 125 N.W. at 1012. 
 270. Id., 125 N.W. at 1012. 
 271. Id., 125 N.W. at 1012. 
 272. See id., 125 N.W. at 1012. 
 273. See id. at 368–71, 125 N.W. 1013–15 (discussing whether the lack of privity 
denies a third-party’s ability to recover for injuries caused by defects in the 
construction built under another contract). 
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Although the court had previously limited the scope of 
Winterbottom274 in Schubert, Justice Jaggard, law professor that he 
was,275 supported his conclusions in O’Brien partly in terms of 
English precedent, concluding that Winterbottom and Langridge v. 
Levy276 were most applicable.  In each case, the Court of Exchequer 
had held that privity was not a bar to recovery by plaintiffs injured 
by dangerous instrumentalities.277  In Langridge v. Levy, the court 
held that a gun seller who misrepresented the quality of a gun to 
the purchaser could be held liable to the son of the purchaser who 
was injured when the gun exploded.278 
The court in O’Brien read the cases as stating that there are two 
primary requirements for the creation of a duty to strangers of a 
contract.279  One is that the thing causing injury has to “be of a 
noxious or dangerous kind,” and the second “that the builder, 
manufacturer, or contractor had actual knowledge of its being in 
such a state of danger as would amount to concealed danger to 
persons using it in ordinary manner and with ordinary care.”280 
The court read Schubert, the leading case in the area, to say the 
following: 
It was there held that if one engaged in the business of 
manufacturing goods not ordinarily of a dangerous 
nature, to be put upon the market for sale and for 
ultimate use, so negligently constructs an article that by 
reason of such negligence it will obviously endanger the 
life or limb of any one who may use it, and if the 
manufacturer, knowing such defects, and knowing that 
the same are so concealed that they are not likely to be 
 
 274. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.). 
 275. TESTIMONY, REMEMBERING MINNESOTA’S SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 193 
(2008). 
 276. (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 868 (Exch.). 
 277. In Langridge, the Court of Exchequer held that liability attached because 
“[t]here is a false representation made by the defendant, with a view that the 
plaintiff should use the instrument in a dangerous way, and, unless the 
representation had been made, the dangerous act would never have been done.”  
Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. at 869.  In Winterbottom, the Court of Exchequer 
distinguished the factual scenario over Langridge to hold that liability did not 
attach because “[in Langridge] the cause of injury was a weapon of a dangerous 
nature, and the defendant was alleged to have had notice of the defect in its 
construction.  Nothing of that sort appears upon this declaration.”  Winterbottom, 
152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
 278. Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. at 868. 
 279. O’Brien v. Am. Bridge Co. 110 Minn. 364, 368, 125 N.W. 1012, 1013 
(1910). 
 280. Id. (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 515 (8th ed. 1908)). 
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discovered, puts the article in his stock of goods for sale, 
he is liable for injuries caused by such negligence to one 
into whose hands the dangerous implement comes for use 
in the usual course of business, even though there be no 
contract relation between the latter and the 
manufacturer.281 
Heaven v. Pender continued to hold sway after the turn of the 
century.  In Depue v. Flateau,282 for example, the plaintiff was a cattle 
buyer who stopped by the defendants’ farm to inspect some cattle 
late on a very cold January afternoon.283  It was too late to inspect 
the cattle, so he asked permission to stay at the defendant’s house 
for the evening.284  The request was refused, but he was asked to stay 
for dinner, during which he became violently ill.285  He again asked 
to stay but the defendant instead assisted him to his cutter to make 
the trip to his home, some seven miles away.286  He was found nearly 
frozen in the morning, three-quarters of a mile from the 
defendants’ farm.287 
With Heaven v. Pender as primary source authority,288 the 
supreme court affirmed the following as the applicable principle: 
[W]henever a person is placed in such a position with 
regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does not use 
due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that 
person, the duty at once arises to exercise care 
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds 
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such 
danger; and a negligent failure to perform the duty 
renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.289 
By 1913, the supreme court was able to say in Farrell v. 
Minneapolis & R.R. Ry. Co.290 that “it is now generally recognized 
that each member of society owes a legal duty, as well as a moral 
 
 281. Id. at 371, 125 N.W. at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 282. 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907). 
 283. Id. at 300–01, 111 N.W. at 1. 
 284. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 1. 
 285. Id. at 301, 111 N.W. at 1–2. 
 286. Id. at 301–02, 111 N.W. at 1–2. 
 287. Id. at 302, 111 N.W. at 2. 
 288. See id. at 303–04, 111 N.W. at 2–3. 
 289. Id. at 303, 111 N.W. at 2.  The supreme court subsequently distinguished 
Depue in Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999), in which the 
defendants failed to assist the plaintiff, a dinner guest, who was injured after a 
night of heavy drinking, on the basis that the plaintiff’s condition was not obvious 
to the defendants. 
 290. 121 Minn. 357, 141 N.W. 491 (1913). 
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obligation, to his fellows.  He must so use his own property as not 
to injure that of others.”291 
Palsgraf makes its appearance in Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel,292 in 
which a pedestrian walking down the sidewalk around midnight 
was hit in the eye by a mud-like substance that fell from somewhere 
in the hotel during the course of a raucous Junior Chamber of 
Commerce convention.293  The pedestrian lost sight in her left 
eye.294 
The supreme court noted the following: 
It is generally agreed that a hotel owner or innkeeper 
owes a duty to the public to protect it against foreseeable 
risk of danger attendant upon the maintenance and 
operation of his property and to keep it in such condition 
that it will not be of danger to pedestrians using streets 
adjacent thereto. 
The failure of a hotel owner and operator to take 
reasonable precautions to eliminate or prevent conditions 
of which he is or should be aware and which might 
reasonably be expected to be dangerous to the public may 
constitute negligence.295 
While the statements might be read to impose a categorical 
duty of reasonable care on an innkeeper, with the reasonable 
precautions question to the breach issue, the court also stated that 
“[t]he common-law test of duty is the probability or foreseeability 
of injury to the plaintiff,” with a first-time reference to Chief Judge 
Cardozo’s statement in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. that 
“[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others 
within the range of apprehension.”296 
Austin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.297 reinforces 
foreseeability’s relation to the duty issue.  The plaintiff in the case 
was a cleaning lady in the employ of a building management firm 
to clean a specific building.298  The defendant was a tenant in the 
 
 291. Id. at 361, 141 N.W. at 492. 
 292. 254 Minn. 373, 95 N.W.2d 657 (1959) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R. 
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 293. Id. at 377–78, 95 N.W.2d at 661–62. 
 294. Id., 95 N.W.2d at 661–62. 
 295. Id. at 380, 95 N.W.2d at 663 (citations omitted). 
 296. Id. at 381, 95 N.W.2d at 664 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). 
 297. 277 Minn. 214, 152 N.W.2d 136 (1967). 
 298. Id. at 215, 152 N.W.2d at 137. 
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building, and the plaintiff’s duties included cleaning the office 
space of the tenant.299  On the day of the accident, the plaintiff 
found a pile of papers in the hallway opposite the defendant’s 
offices.300  The tenant had previously been asked by the 
management company not to pile discarded material in the 
hallway.301  The plaintiff fell while picking up a small box on top of 
the pile.302  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in 
creating a dangerous condition in the hallway.303  Following Palsgraf 
and Connolly, the supreme court concluded that the harm to the 
plaintiff could not have been anticipated by the defendant and 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendant.304  Austin and Connolly are consistently taken, either 
individually or together, to link duty and foreseeability.305 
Because foreseeability is linked to duty, courts, as gatekeepers, 
decide whether duty is triggered by the foreseeability of injury.  
The supreme court has, however, taken different, potentially 
inconsistent, positions on whether or when duty is supposed to be a 
jury issue.  In Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home Supply Co.,306 the 
court stated that given the choice of resolving the foreseeability 
issue on summary judgment or submitting the issue to the jury, 
“generally the better rule is to submit the issue of foreseeability to the 
jury.”307 
In Lundgren v. Fultz,308 the court held that “[c]lose questions on 
foreseeability should be given to the jury.”309  In Larson v. Larson,310 
the court, citing Lundgren, stated “that in close cases foreseeability 
may be for jury resolution.”311  In Bjerke v. Johnson,312 the standard was 
 
 299. Id., 152 N.W.2d at 137. 
 300. Id., 152 N.W.2d at 137. 
 301. Id., 152 N.W.2d at 137. 
 302. Id. at 215–16, 152 N.W.2d at 137. 
 303. Id. at 216, 152 N.W.2d at 138. 
 304. Id. at 217, 152 N.W.2d at 138. 
 305. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007); Molloy v. Meier, 
679 N.W.2d 711, 719–20 (Minn. 2004); Quinn v. Winkel’s, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 65, 68 
(Minn. 1979); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 813 (Minn. 1979) 
(Scott, J., dissenting); Vogt v. Johnson, 278 Minn. 153, 158, 153 N.W.2d 247, 251 
(1967). 
 306. 308 Minn. 152, 241 N.W.2d 306 (1976). 
 307. Id. at 156, 241 N.W.2d at 309 (emphasis added). 
 308. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984). 
 309. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
 310. 373 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1985). 
 311. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). 
 312. 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). 
  
1098 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
that “[w]hen it is clear whether an incident was foreseeable, the 
courts decide the issue as a matter of law, but in close cases, 
foreseeability is reserved for the jury.”313  In Foss v. Kincade,314 the 
supreme court rephrased Lundgren in stating that “[a]lthough in 
most cases the question of foreseeability is an issue for the jury, the 
foreseeability of harm can be decided by the court as a matter of 
law when the issue is clear.”315  The statement in Foss is close to the 
court’s position in Szyplinski.  Foss is the latest supreme court case 
setting out a standard for determining when foreseeability is for the 
jury.  The differences are perhaps slight, but the signal in Foss is 
stronger that foreseeability should generally be decided by the jury. 
The differences in how the standard is framed may send 
conflicting signals to the lower courts as to how they should 
approach motions for summary judgment based upon lack of duty.  
This could create confusion and influence whether or not cases are 
decided on summary judgment.  In Kay v. Fairview Riverside 
Hospital,316 the court of appeals followed Larson in stating that 
“[t]he issue of foreseeability is generally decided by the court as a 
matter of law,” although “in close cases . . . the issue may be 
decided by the jury.”317  A little over a year later, in Howard v. 
Mackenhausen,318 the court of appeals followed Szyplinski in deciding 
that the foreseeability issue is best resolved by a jury rather than on 
summary judgment.319 
At the other extreme is Alholm v. Wilt,320 an innkeeper’s liability 
case decided in 1986, two years after Lundgren, in which the 
supreme court indicated its concern over jury resolution of the 
foreseeability issue.321  There are four elements in an innkeeper’s 
liability case in Minnesota: First, there has to be some act or threat 
that puts the proprietor on notice of the offending party’s vicious 
or dangerous propensities.322  Second, the proprietor has to have 
 
 313. Id. at 667–68 (emphasis added). 
 314. 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
 315. Id. at 322–23 (emphasis added). 
 316. 531 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the trial court’s grant 
of summary judgment for the defendant), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). 
 317. Id. at 519. 
 318. 553 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996). 
 319. Id. at 439. 
 320. 394 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1986). 
 321. Id. at 491 n.5. 
 322. Id. at 490 n.3. 
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adequate opportunity to protect the patron who is injured.323  
Third, the proprietor must have failed to take reasonable measures 
to protect the injured patron.324  Fourth, the injury to the patron 
must have been foreseeable.325 
In a footnote, the supreme court took the opportunity to 
express its concern over the treatment of the foreseeability issue: 
Although not raised on this appeal, we are troubled by the 
practice of placing foreseeability within the jury’s domain.  
The foreseeability issue, as a threshold issue, is more 
properly decided by the court prior to submitting the case 
to the jury.  If the trial court concludes that the innkeeper 
did not have notice of the person’s dangerous 
propensities, then it must find that the injury would not 
have been foreseeable to a reasonable innkeeper and 
thus, no duty to protect arose.  Because foreseeability has 
nothing to do with proximate cause, we do not believe 
that the jury should be instructed on the issue.  To the 
extent our prior case law speaks of “foreseeability” as an 
element of the cause of action, we were only discussing 
foreseeability in the context of whether a legal duty arises, 
not as something on which the jury should be 
instructed.326 
The footnote has been influential in shaping the approach to 
innkeeper’s liability cases,327 but it has not been limited to just those 
cases.328  One way to read Alholm is that courts, not juries, decide 
foreseeability issues in all circumstances, particularly as to the duty 
issue. 
 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id.; see also Boone v. Martinez, 567 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1997) 
(reaffirming the basic elements of innkeeper liability).  This statement of the 
elements does not square readily with other cases establishing the innkeeper 
liability standard, in particular, Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382, 95 
N.W.2d 657, 664 (1959). 
 326. Alholm, 394 N.W.2d at 491 n.5 (citation omitted). 
 327. See, e.g., Boone, 567 N.W.2d at 510; Minks v. Cherry, No. A06-1166, 2007 
WL 1053501, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007); Roy v. Banana Joes of Minn., 
Inc., No. A04-54, 2004 WL 2220995, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2004); Clemens 
v. Comm., Inc., No. A03-252, 2004 WL 117536, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 
2004); Brickey v. D & R Props., Inc., No. C3-97-1961, 1998 WL 88604, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1998). 
 328. See, e.g., Watkins v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., No. A04-150, 2004 WL 
2049977, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004) (bus station murder); Knaack v. 
Holstad, No. CX-95-222, 1995 WL 333864, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 1995) 
(products liability). 
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In Cooney v. Hooks,329 a case involving sexual assault of a jailed 
prisoner by another prisoner, the supreme court seemed to use 
Alholm’s “we are troubled by the practice of placing foreseeability 
within the jury’s domain” language to trump Lundgren’s “[c]lose 
questions on foreseeability should be given to the jury” language.330  
The plaintiff was jailed after his arrest for driving while intoxicated 
and, while incapacitated, was sexually assaulted by another 
detainee.331  The case went to trial.332  The jury found the County 
54.1% at fault and the plaintiff 45.9% at fault.333  The trial court 
granted the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of breach 
of duty.334  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that the County owed a duty to the 
plaintiff under the circumstances.335 
On appeal, the supreme court noted that the County 
conceded it owed a duty to use reasonable care to protect its 
prisoners from assaults by other prisoners.336  Notwithstanding the 
concession, the court said that the County was not a guarantor of 
the safety of prisoners, seemingly taking the position that the 
County owed no duty to the plaintiff under the circumstances.337  
The plaintiff argued Lundgren and that the foreseeability issue 
should be for the jury.338  The court countered with Alholm and 
concluded that the assault on the plaintiff was not foreseeable as a 
matter of law.339  Cooney has been cited for the proposition that 
“[f]oreseeability is generally a threshold legal question for the 
court to decide.”340 
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While there is some inconsistency in the supreme court’s 
decisions concerning the role of foreseeability in determining duty 
and under what circumstances the foreseeability issue is for the 
court or jury, the weight and currency of the decisions seem to 
follow some variation of Lundgren, rather than Alholm, at least on 
the issue of whether foreseeability is an issue for the jury to 
decide.341  If foreseeability is a requirement, another issue is how 
specifically foreseeable the plaintiff’s injury has to be. 
In Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,342 a products liability case, 
the court noted the manufacturer’s duty to protect users of its 
products from foreseeable dangers, but it stated that in deciding 
“whether a danger is foreseeable, courts look at whether the specific 
danger was objectively reasonable to expect, not simply whether it was within 
the realm of any conceivable possibility” and that a danger that “is not 
objectively reasonable to expect is too remote to create liability on 
the part of the manufacturer.”343  The exact meaning of the 
statement is not clear, but it appears to tighten the standard for 
determining foreseeability, giving courts an additional tool for 
scrutinizing the foreseeability of an injury as a predicate to a 
finding of duty. 
The origin of the court’s test is not clear, however.  The court 
relied on a 1963 Missouri Supreme Court case, Kettler v. Hampton,344 
for its authority, but that case did not frame the foreseeability issue 
in the same terms as the court did in Whiteford.345  Following a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff in Kettler, the defendant appealed, arguing 
that the verdict-directing instruction requested by the plaintiff and 
given by the trial judge was in error because it did not include the 
element of foreseeability.346  The Missouri Supreme Court said that 
“[o]rdinarily, the duties imposed by the law of negligence arise out 
of circumstances and are based on for[e]seeability or reasonable 
anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or 
 
 341. See Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 322–23 (Minn. 2009). 
 342. 582 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. 1998). 
 343. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). 
 344. 365 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1963).  The plaintiff, a garage customer, brought 
suit against a service station operator for injuries he sustained when his car 
lurched forward while it was being serviced.  Id. at 519.  The plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant left the car in gear.  Id.  The defendant claimed that the plaintiff 
did.  Id.  The plaintiff received a judgment against the defendant, who appealed to 
the Missouri Supreme Court.  Id. 
 345. Id. at 522–23 
 346. Id. at 521–22. 
  
1102 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
omissions.”347  Subsequent cases citing Kettler bear out the 
conclusion that the court is simply concerned about the reasonable 
foreseeability of injury, not the specific injury that occurred in the 
case.348  The potentially more restrictive language noted by the 
court in Whiteford does not appear in Kettler.349 
The “objectively reasonable to expect” concept quickly worked 
its way into Minnesota negligence law, providing yet another means 
of tightening the relationship between duty and foreseeability and 
strengthening the role of the courts in the resolution of the duty 
issue.  Most of the appellate decisions applying the Whiteford 
standard have resulted in judgments for the defendants, whether 
pre- or post-trial.350  The standard seems to be tighter than the 
general foreseeability standard from other cases, such as Connolly, 
 
 347. Id. at 522. 
 348. See Helming v. Dulle, 441 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1969) (“The duties 
imposed by the law of negligence arise out of circumstances and are based on 
foreseeability or reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts 
or omissions”); Price v. Seidler, 408 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Mo. 1966) (“All that is 
necessary to establish foreseeability is knowledge, actual or constructive, on the 
part of the defendant that there is some probability of injury sufficiently serious 
that the ordinary person would take precautions to avoid it.”). 
 349. Compare Kettler, 365 S.W.2d at 522, with Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 
582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998). 
 350.  E.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 2009) (no duty to child 
injured by falling bookcase); Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919 (no duty to child 
injured sliding under snowmobile with sharp bracket on the underside); Czech v. 
Little Falls Area Chamber of Commerce, No. A10-269, 2010 WL 3396989, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2010) (no duty to employee of contractor hired to clear 
pigeons from historic building); Garrett v. Reuben, No. A09-1804, 2010 WL 
2266401, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8, 2010) (no duty to decedent who suffered 
fatal heart attack several hours after triggering incident); Doe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 
No. 152, No. A06-611, 2007 WL 92904, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (no 
duty to protect minor from criminal sexual contact at school district controlled 
sports center); Stuedemann v. Nose, 713 N.W.2d 79, 84–86 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) 
(no duty for foster home owner or psychologist to prevent resident from sexually 
assaulting and murdering another person); Robb v. Funorama, Inc., No. A04-1711, 
2005 WL 1331265, at *5–6 (Minn. Ct. App. June 7, 2005) (no duty to prevent 
third-person, in an unknown conflict with the plaintiff, from injuring plaintiff); 
Watkins v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., No. A04-150, 2004 WL 2049977, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004) (no duty to prevent unforeseeable murder of bus 
passenger); D.E.L. v. Blue Earth Cnty. ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. A03-1114, 
2004 WL 728090, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004) (no duty to warn foster 
parents of danger of sexual abuse by foster child); Kuhl v. Heinen, 672 N.W.2d 
590, 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (no duty to prevent children in driveway from 
distracting passing motorist and thereby causing accidents).  The court of appeals 
held that the foreseeability issue was a jury issue in Laska v. Anoka County, 696 
N.W.2d 133, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (death of infant under care of daycare 
provider). 
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and thus inviting more discerning and nuanced judgments about 
the foreseeability of particular injuries.351 
On the other hand, if Whiteford is simply reaffirming the notion 
that injury has to be foreseeable in order for a defendant to be 
negligent, it does not state, nor should it be read as stating, a more 
restrictive principle.  If Whiteford is read as establishing a more 
severe standard for resolution of the foreseeability issue, it arguably 
conflicts with other supreme court decisions that specifically avoid 
any conclusion that the specific danger has to be objectively 
foreseeable. 
In Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments,352 for example, the supreme 
court said that “[w]e have often held that negligence is not to be 
determined by whether the particular injury was foreseeable.”353  
The cases go back over a century to Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. 
& O. Ry. Co., where the court said that “[i]f a person had no 
reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or 
might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would 
not be negligent at all . . . .”354  The issue concerns foreseeability of 
any injury, not the specific injury.355  The most recent word on the 
issue is Foss v. Kincade,356 which incorporated the Whiteford standard 
in its analysis.357 
Irrespective of whether the courts continue to view the 
statement in Whiteford as the standard to be applied in negligence 
cases, there are other cases in which the duty determination has 
 
 351. See Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 381–84, 95 N.W.2d 657, 
664–65 (1959). 
 352. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983) (finding apartment complex negligent for 
hiring caretaker with criminal history). 
 353. Id. at 912 (citing Connolly, 254 Minn. at 381–82, 95 N.W.2d at 664) 
(exemplifying innkeeper’s liability); Albertson v. Chi., Minneapolis, St. Paul & Pac. 
R.R. Co., 242 Minn. 50, 64 N.W.2d 175 (1954)).  The court went on to say that 
[t]he jury, as finder of fact, could have found, as it did, that it was 
reasonably foreseeable that a person with a history of offenses of violence 
could commit another violent crime, notwithstanding the history would 
not have shown him to ever have committed the particular type of 
offense. Moreover, the risk of injury being foreseeable, it is clear the 
tenants of an apartment complex, including Mrs. Ponticas, were 
foreseeable plaintiffs. 
Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912 (citing Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 
Minn. 214, 152 N.W.2d 136 (1967)). 
 354. 67 Minn. 94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896). 
 355. See id. 
 356. 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009). 
 357. Id. at 322–23.  Somewhat ironically, the dissenting justice in Foss wrote the 
opinion for the court in Whiteford. 
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been made on a categorical basis, with foreseeability left to the 
breach issue.  Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co.358 is a good example.  
The case involved an assault and rape of the plaintiff in a 
downtown Minneapolis parking ramp.359  She brought suit against 
the owner and operator of the ramp and the security firm that had 
been hired to patrol the ramp.360  In general terms, the court noted 
that 
[i]f the law is to impose a duty on A to protect B from C’s 
criminal acts, the law usually looks for a special 
relationship between A and B, a situation where B has in 
some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has 
accepted that entrustment.  This special relationship also 
assumes that the harm represented by C is something that 
A is in a position to protect against and should be 
expected to protect against.361 
As illustrations, the court noted that a duty to protect could be 
found in common carrier-passenger or innkeeper-guest 
relationships.362  The court thought the hospital-patient 
relationship was analogous to the innkeeper-guest relationship.363 
The court initially said that the decision of whether a duty is 
imposed depends on “the relationship of the parties and the 
foreseeable risk involved,” but that the question is ultimately one of 
policy.364  The defendants argued that the prevention of crime 
should be a governmental function, not the responsibility of the 
private sector, and that imposing a duty would not lead to the 
application of an ascertainable standard of care.365  The court 
added a third policy consideration, a cost-benefit consideration, 
which it viewed as an issue of how much risk is acceptable for 
members of the public.366 
 
 358. 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989). 
 359. Id. at 166. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 168. 
 362. Id. (citing Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 386–87, 
53 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1952); Roettger v. United Hosps. of St. Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 
856, 859–60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 363. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d. at 168.  As an additional example, the court noted 
that while there might be a close relationship between a nurse companion and 
homeowner, a private homeowner is generally not in a position to guard against 
the criminal activity of a third party.  See Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 
(Minn.1985). 
 364. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168–69. 
 365. Id. at 169. 
 366. Id. 
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The court concluded that the circumstances of the case, 
including a large parking ramp in a downtown metropolitan area 
that provided opportunities for crime, did not justify a conclusion 
that the parking ramp operator owed no duty to protect its 
customers.367  The court held that the parking ramp operator owed 
a duty, explaining it in these terms: 
These general characteristics of a parking ramp facility, it 
seems to us, present a particular focus or unique 
opportunity for criminals and their criminal activities, an 
opportunity which to some degree is different from that 
presented out on the street and in the neighborhood 
generally.  We do not think the law should say the 
operator of a parking ramp owes no duty to protect its 
customers. Some duty is owed.368 
The court then suggested that the duty should be defined and 
explained to the jury in these terms: 
The operator or owner of a parking ramp facility has a 
duty to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity on its 
premises which may cause personal harm to customers.  
The care to be provided is that care which a reasonably 
prudent operator or owner would provide under like 
circumstances.  Among the circumstances to be 
considered are the location and construction of the ramp, 
the practical feasibility and cost of various security 
measures, and the risk of personal harm to customers 
which the owner or operator knows, or in the exercise of 
due care should know, presents a reasonable likelihood of 
happening.  In this connection, the owner or operator is 
not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of its premises 
and cannot be expected to prevent all criminal activity.  
The fact that a criminal assault occurs on the premises, 
standing alone, is not evidence that the duty to deter 
criminal acts has been breached.369 
The court thought that casting the operator’s duty in terms of 
an obligation to use reasonable care to deter criminal activity and 
requiring the jury to weigh the likelihood of risk against the 
financial and practical means to meet the risk provided for the 
implementation of the policy considerations important to the 
 
 367. Id. 169–70. 
 368. Id. at 169. 
 369. Id. at 169–70. 
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case.370  The court also noted that there would be some cases in 
which a trial court would find that the duty to use reasonable care 
was discharged as a matter of law, but it is clear that the court is 
referring to the breach rather than duty issue.371 
Erickson might be read in different ways.  Taken superficially, it 
could be read as holding that the duty determination depends on 
the relationship of the parties and the foreseeable risk involved.  
Initially, the court framed the issue in terms of the obligation to 
prevent the criminal misconduct of a third person.372  While the 
special relationship is important, the court effectively determined 
that the nature of the relationship between parking ramp operator 
and patrons of the ramp justified a finding of duty.373  To the extent 
that foreseeability is considered, it is in general and not in specific 
terms.374  The court’s supporting authority also supports the finding 
of a duty based upon the relationship, with the specific facts, 
including foreseeability, as factors for the jury.375  The distinction is 
effectively between legislative and adjudicative facts. 
Erickson might also be read as always requiring inquiry in the 
failure to protect cases into whether there is a special relationship 
and foreseeable risk, but also whether the specific risk in the case 
was foreseeable.  The latter reading gives courts the green light to 
engage in a more detailed analysis of the specific facts, although 
Erickson seems to suggest to the contrary. 
Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments376 raised the issue of whether the 
employer of an apartment manager who sexually assaulted a tenant 
could be held liable for negligent hiring.  The court held that it 
could.377 
The duty determination was made in clear, categorical terms.  
The court applied the standard from section 213 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency in holding that an employer has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring individuals who may, 
given the nature of the employment, create a risk of injury to 
 
 370. Id. at 170. 
 371. See id. 
 372. Id. at 169. 
 373. Id. 
 374. See id. 
 375. See, e.g., Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 386–87, 53 
N.W.2d 17, 19 (1952). 
 376. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983). 
 377. Id. at 917. 
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members of the public.378  Foreseeability, in the court’s opinion, 
related to the breach issue.379  The court concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish breach of the duty and sustain 
the jury’s finding of negligence.380 
There are other examples, including cases involving 
landowners’ duties.  In Peterson v. Balach,381 the supreme court 
eliminated the distinctions between invitees and licensees in favor 
of a general duty of reasonable care to entrants.382  The categorical 
determination that landowners owe a duty to entrants on their 
property leaves the breach issue to the jury, which considers several 
factors, including the circumstances of the entry and the 
foreseeability of harm.383  Applications of Peterson have been 
checkered in subsequent cases, however.  While some decisions 
have recognized that the duty is established and that foreseeability 
is the jury’s province, others have assumed that the Peterson factors 
apply to the duty determination.384  If there is a duty and a court is 
reluctant to conclude as a matter of law that the defendant was not 
negligent, proximate cause may be an impediment to recovery 
based upon unforeseeability of the plaintiff’s injury. 
 
 
 378. Id. at 910–11 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958)).  
Section 213 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency reads in part as follows:  
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is 
subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent 
or reckless . . . (b) in the employment of improper persons or 
instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others . . . .   
The court has previously recognized a claim for negligent retention.  Porter v. 
Grennan Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, 16 N.W.2d 906 (1945); Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N.W. 703 (1913); Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot, 41 
Minn. 360, 43 N.W. 54 (1889). 
 379. See Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d. at 912 (“The most troublesome issue is whether 
these appellants-employers breached their duty by subjecting these foreseeable 
plaintiffs to a foreseeable injury by employing an incompetent person. If the 
employer ‘knew or should have known’ of the incompetence, and notwithstanding 
hired the employee, there would exist a breach of duty.”). 
 380. Id. at 912–13. 
 381. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). 
 382. See id. at 174 n.7, 199 N.W.2d at 648 n.7. 
 383. Id. 
 384. See generally Steenson, supra note 229.  Most recently, in Foss v. Kincade, 
766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009), the supreme court determined that an owner owed 
no duty because an injury sustained by a visiting three-year-old when a bookcase 
he was climbing tipped over on him was not foreseeable. 
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B. Breach of Duty 
The law governing the breach issue is probably the clearest in 
Minnesota law.  Minnesota’s pattern instruction defines reasonable 
care as “the care a reasonable person would use in the same or 
similar circumstances” and negligence as “the failure to use 
reasonable care.”385  The pattern instruction does not include any 
specific reference to the foreseeability of a particular injury or class 
of injuries,386 but foreseeability would be a focus in any attempt to 
prove negligence.387  On occasion, the supreme court has suggested 
relevant factors for the trier of fact to consider in deciding the 
breach issue, including risk-utility factors,388 but the primary 
standard is the general negligence standard.  There is some 
inconsistency in the Minnesota cases concerning the propriety of 
general versus specific instructions in negligence cases.389  The 
negligence issue is ordinarily for the jury.390 
 
 385. 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 
25.10 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, 5th ed. 2006).  The supreme court 
approved the predecessor of CIVJIG 25.10 in Lommen v. Adolphson & Peterson 
Construction Co., 283 Minn. 451, 455, 168 N.W.2d 673, 677 (1969). 
 386. 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES―CIVIL, CIVJIG 
25.10 (Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, 5th ed. 2006).  
 387. See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 
1277 (2009) (“Long recognized as providing tort, the law of wrongs, with principle 
and boundaries, foreseeability crucially defines the nature and scope of 
responsibility in tort—its internal meaning and proper limits—especially in 
negligence.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 388. In Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972), the court 
rejected the distinctions between invitees and licensees in favor of a reasonable 
care balancing approach.  The court set out several factors that a jury might 
consider in determining whether a possessor used reasonable care, including “the 
circumstances under which the entrant enters the land (licensee or invitee); 
foreseeability or possibility of harm; duty to inspect, repair, or warn; 
reasonableness of inspection or repair; and opportunity and ease of repair or 
correction.”  Id. at 175 n.7, 199 N.W.2d at 648 n.7.  In Erickson v. Curtis Investment 
Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989), the court set out several factors a jury should 
consider in determining whether a parking ramp facility is negligent in failing to 
prevent criminal activity on its premises, including “the location and construction 
of the ramp, the practical feasibility and cost of various security measures, and the 
risk of personal harm to customers which the owner or operator knows, or in the 
exercise of due care should know, presents a reasonable likelihood of happening.”  
Id. at 170. 
 389. Domagala v. Rolland, 787 N.W.2d 662, 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) 
(discussing the split in Minnesota case law on the issue of generalized jury 
instructions versus special instructions). 
 390. E.g., Peterson v. Pawelk, 263 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. 1978) (quoting 
Bowe v. Fredlund, 108 Minn. 103, 108, 203 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1972)); Stenzel v. 
Bach, 295 Minn. 257, 259–60, 203 N.W.2d 819, 821 (1973); Teas v. Minneapolis St. 
  
2011] MINNESOTA NEGLIGENCE LAW 1109 
C. Proximate Cause 
Traditional treatments break proximate cause into two 
elements, cause in fact and legal cause or scope of liability.391  
Minnesota has taken differing positions on proximate cause, 
sometimes conflating the elements by making the test for cause in 
fact the test for legal cause or scope of liability issues and 
sometimes splitting them.392  The cases have also used differing 
standards for each element.393 
1. Cause in Fact 
The Third Restatement adopts a but-for standard for 
determining cause in fact in negligence cases.394  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has at various times applied a but-for standard to 
determine causation,395 rejected the but-for standard,396 recognized 
that the but-for standard is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to establish cause in fact,397 and concluded that the predominant 
standard for determining cause in fact is the substantial factor test, 
even though the but-for standard is the accepted test for cause in 
fact issues in professional liability cases.398  Minnesota’s pattern jury 
 
Ry. Co., 244 Minn. 427, 434–35, 70 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1955); Aubin v. Duluth St. 
Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 345–46, 211 N.W. 580, 582 (1926). 
 391. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 443 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. 
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 263–
73 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 311 (1941).  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has equated proximate cause with legal cause.  See 
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Minn. 2008). 
 392. E.g., Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 328, 22 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1946) 
(stating that the proper test for determining legal cause, rather than cause in fact, 
is the substantial factor test).  Compare Staloch v. Belsaas, 271 Minn. 315, 136 
N.W.2d 92 (1965) (discussing proximate cause in terms of legal cause), with Nees 
v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758 (1944) (discussing 
proximate cause in terms of causes in fact). 
 393. See supra note 392. 
 394. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 (2010). 
 395. E.g., Raske v. Gavin, 438 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Blue Water Corp. v. O’Toole, 336 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn. 1983)) (applying the 
but-for standard without mention of the substantial factor test). 
 396. Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. 1994) (per 
curiam). 
 397. George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Minn. 2006). 
 398. Fiedler v. Adams, 466 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“Generally, 
proof of proximate causation in a legal malpractice action is the same as in an 
ordinary negligence action.  In some cases, however, where the attorney’s alleged 
negligence has caused the loss of or damage to the client’s existing cause of 
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instructions use the term “direct cause” rather than “proximate 
cause” to avoid confusion.399  According to the pattern instruction, 
a cause is a “direct cause” if it “had a substantial part in bringing 
about the (collision) (accident) (event) (harm) (injury).”400 
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the substantial factor 
test in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.,401 a case 
concerning the liability of a railroad for a fire that joined with 
another to burn out the plaintiff’s land, but where either fire would 
have been sufficient to cause the damage.402  The but-for standard 
would have negated liability on the part of the railroad for the fire 
it started.  Instead, the supreme court held that the trial court was 
correct in instructing the jury that 
[i]f you find that other fires not set by one of defendant’s 
engines mingled with one that was set by one of 
defendant’s engines, there may be difficulty in 
determining whether you should find that the fire set by 
the engine was a material or substantial element in 
causing plaintiff’s damage.  If it was, the defendant is 
liable; otherwise, it is not.403 
Anderson is generally credited as the first case to adopt the 
substantial factor test, but as a solution to issues of legal cause in 
cases where either of two or more causes would have been 
sufficient to cause the harm.404  Notwithstanding that context, the 
 
action, the client asserting malpractice must also prove that but for the attorney’s 
negligence, ‘he had a meritorious cause of action originally.’  In essence, this 
‘case-within-a-case’ element describes the proximate cause element unique to 
malpractice cases alleging destruction of the client’s cause of action.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 399. 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES―CIVIL, CIVJIG 
27.10 (Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, 5th ed. 2006). 
 400. Id. 
 401. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). 
 402. Id. at 440–41, 179 N.W. at 49. 
 403. Id. at 434, 179 N.W. at 46. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 404. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. j reporters’ note (2010).  The reporters’ note further explains the 
following: 
[Anderson] employed it to deal with an overdetermined-outcome 
situation: two separate fires joined together and burned the plaintiff’s 
property; either fire alone would have been sufficient to cause the same 
harm.  Thus, it is not surprising that some courts and commentators have 
understood “substantial factor” to bear on factual cause while others have 
interpreted it to address proximate cause.  The confusion has been 
exacerbated, no doubt, by the first two Restatements’ use of the umbrella 
term “legal cause,” to include both factual cause and proximate cause. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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substantial factor test has become the preferred standard for 
determining cause in fact in negligence cases,405 although in doing 
so the court often conflates cause in fact with scope of liability.406 
a. “But-for” Rejected 
The ostensible curse of the but-for test is that it is potentially 
unlimited, a concern the Minnesota Supreme Court has raised on 
more than one occasion.  Two cases illustrate the court’s problem 
with the but-for standard.  In Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 
600,407 a Civil Damages Act case, the plaintiffs sued the American 
Legion post for damages arising out of a wrist injury sustained by 
Mrs. Kryzer when she became intoxicated at the post and was 
removed from the bar by a post employee.408  The trial court held 
that the connection between her intoxication and injury was too 
remote and “dismiss[ed] plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action . . . .”409  The court of appeals reversed, applying a 
but-for standard as the appropriate test for determining the causal 
link between Kryzer’s intoxication and injury.410  The supreme 
court reversed the court of appeals, chiding the lower court for 
adopting a but-for standard in Civil Damages Act cases in the face 
of settled Minnesota law requiring that the intoxication be the 
proximate cause of the injury.411  The supreme court held that 
“Mrs. Kryzer’s intoxication may have been the occasion for her 
ejection from the legion club, but it did not cause either her injury 
or that sustained by the plaintiff.”412 
 
 
 405. See George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Minn. 2006). 
 406. See supra note 392.  See also Dellow v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 453–54, 107 
N.W.2d 859, 860–61 (1961) (discussing the confusion raised by issues of proximate 
cause and noting that “there is no simple formula for defining proximate cause, 
but this is assumed to be a difficulty peculiar to the law, which distinguishes 
between ‘proximate cause’ and ‘cause in fact’” (footnote omitted)). 
 407. 494 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1992). 
 408. Id. at 36. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 481 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
 411. Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 37.  For a more detailed analysis of the causation 
issues in Civil Damage Act cases see Mike Steenson, Proximate Cause in Civil 
Damages Act Cases, 2 WM. MITCHELL J.L. & PRAC. 6 (2009), available at 
http://lawandpractice.wordpress.com/2009/03/01/proximate-cause-in-civil-
damages-act-cases/. 
 412. 494 N.W.2d at 37. 
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The second case is Harpster v. Hetherington.413  The plaintiff and 
defendants in the case were neighbors and friends who looked 
after each other’s dogs as needed.414  The plaintiff had gone to her 
neighbors’ house to look after their dog.415  She let the dog out into 
the fenced-in backyard while she prepared food for the dog.416  In 
the meantime, the dog escaped through a broken gate in the 
fence.417  Not seeing the dog, she went out the front to call for the 
dog and slipped on the steps, which had become icy due to recent 
precipitation.418  Because there was no possibility of establishing any 
negligence on the part of the defendants in maintaining the steps, 
the plaintiff sued on the basis that they were negligent in the 
maintenance of the gate;419 “that this negligence caused her to fall 
off the front stoop;”420 and that negligence led to the dog’s escape 
and then to the plaintiff’s injury.421  The case was tried to a 
conclusion before a jury, which found the defendants sixty percent 
negligent and the plaintiff forty percent negligent.422  The trial 
court entered judgment for the plaintiff.423 
The defendants argued in the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
that there was no proximate cause as a matter of law and that the 
trial court erred in refusing to give their requested instruction on 
superseding cause.424  The court of appeals affirmed in a split 
opinion.425 
 
 
 
 
 413. 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994). 
 414. Id. at 585. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 586. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Harpster v. Hetherington, No. C9-93-787, 1993 WL 469153, at *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1993). 
 425. Id. at *2.  Judge Davies, dissenting, concluded that the “[f]ailure to repair 
the back gate—whether negligent or not—is not a proximate cause of the kindly 
neighbor’s slip and fall on the front stoop—no matter what the little dog did,” and 
furthermore, relying on Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), that 
“the appellant had no duty, as repair of the back gate was neglected, to protect 
against a fall on the front stoop—again, no matter what the little dog might do.”  
Id. (Davies, J., dissenting). 
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The defendants renewed their proximate cause and 
superseding cause arguments on their appeal to the supreme 
court.426  The brief relied on somewhat limited authority, but the 
first argument focused on the lack of a sufficient causal 
relationship between the defendants’ negligence and the plaintiff’s 
injuries, arguing both that the gate was a remote cause of the injury 
and that the plaintiff’s conduct in slipping on the front steps was a 
superseding cause.427 
In Minnesota, an intervening cause becomes a superseding 
cause if four elements are satisfied.428  The first is that the harmful 
effects said to constitute the superseding cause must have occurred 
 
 426. Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994).  The 
respondents’ brief relied on three cases in arguing that there was no proximate 
cause as a matter of law.  Appellants’ Brief and Appendix at 7–9, Harpster v. 
Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994) (No. C9-93-787) [hereinafter 
Harpster Appellate Brief].  One of the cases, Medved v. Doolittle, defined a 
proximate cause as “the act or omission which causes it directly or immediately, or 
through a natural sequence of events, without the intervention of another 
independent and efficient cause.”  220 Minn. 352, 356–57, 19 N.W.2d 788, 790 
(1945), overruled in part on other grounds by Strobel v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. 
R.R. Co., 255 Minn. 201, 207–08 n.5, 96 N.W.2d 195, 200 n.5 (1959) (cause need 
not be predominant cause to be a proximate cause).  The respondents placed 
primary reliance on two other cases.  See Harpster Appellate Brief, supra note 424, 
at 7–9.  The brief relied on Erickson v. Van Web Equip. Co., 270 Minn. 42, 49, 132 
N.W.2d 814, 820 (1965), in arguing that “[a] proximate cause is one in which is 
involved the idea of necessity.”  Harpster Appellate Brief, supra note 426, at 7.  The 
notion of “necessity” is not one that caught on in the Minnesota cases, but in 
context, the supreme court’s concern in Erickson appears to be that there was 
simply no causal connection between the defendants’ negligence, if any, and the 
plaintiff’s injuries.  Id. at 7–8.  The lack of clear evidence of negligence and the 
plaintiff’s assumption of the risk clouded the court’s opinion on the proximate 
cause issue.  The other case, Hamilton v. Vare, 184 Minn. 580, 239 N.W. 659 (1931), 
was an automobile accident case involving, among other things, a question 
concerning the liability of the City of Saint Paul for negligently allowing sand and 
gravel on a city street.  Harpster Appellate. Brief, supra note 424, at 8–9.  The 
problem as it appears from the facts is that the street condition had nothing to do 
with causing the accident.  Id.  The supreme court thought that the sand and 
gravel were “a condition, perhaps a remote cause, but not a direct or proximate 
cause.”  Hamilton, 184 Minn. at 583, 239 N.W. at 660.  The brief argued that the 
injury to the plaintiff in Harpster was simply more remote even than the one in 
Hamilton.  Harpster Appellate Brief, supra note 426, at 9. 
 
 425. Respondent’s Brief at 4–12, Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 
(Minn. 1994) (No. C9-93-787) [hereinafter Harpster Respondent’s Brief]. 
 428. Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997); 
Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1992); Rieger v. 
Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Minn. 1982); Kroeger v. Lee, 270 Minn. 75, 78, 132 
N.W.2d 727, 729-30 (1965). 
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after the original negligence.429  The second is that the intervening 
cause must not have been brought about by the original 
negligence.430  The third is that the intervening cause must have 
worked actively to bring about a result that would not have 
otherwise followed from the original negligence.431  The fourth is 
that the intervening cause must have been reasonably foreseeable 
to the original wrongdoer.432  Superseding cause concedes cause in 
fact.433  The focus on the remoteness of the cause and superseding 
cause in Hetherington really seems to be a proxy for a scope of 
liability argument. 
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals in a per 
curiam opinion.434  The court did not directly address the 
defendants’ arguments, concluding instead that the case had been 
decided on a but-for theory of causation, a theory long-discredited 
in Minnesota and recently rejected by the court just two years 
earlier in Kryzer.435  Applying the but-for approach to causation, the 
court said, “is much like arguing that if one had not got up in the 
morning, the accident would not have happened.”436  The court 
proceeded to give but-for both barrels: 
The problem with the “but for” test, as this case illustrates, 
is that with a little ingenuity it converts events both near 
and far, which merely set the stage for an accident, into a 
 
 429. See cases cited supra note 428. 
 430. See cases cited supra note 428. 
 431. See cases cited supra note 428. 
 432. See cases cited supra note 428. 
 433. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 34 cmt. b. 
 434. Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. 1994) 
 435. Id. (citing Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 
1992)). 
 436. Id. at 586.  In George v. Estate of Baker, the court rejected the but-for 
standard as the proximate cause standard “because [i]n a philosophical sense, the 
causes of an accident go back to the birth of the parties and the discovery of 
America.”  724 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting 
William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19, 22 
(1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Johnson v. Chi. G. W. R. Co., the 
court in an FELA case, further stretching the abuse of the but-for standard, 
observed that “[b]ut for the initial appearance of man on this planet the collision 
would not have occurred, but that fact alone cannot place any direct causal 
responsibility upon Adam.”  242 Minn. 130, 136, 64 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1954).  
Putting aside any potential theological problem with that conclusion based upon 
original sin, it would be difficult to conclude that a collision in the 1950s would be 
within the bundle of risks created by Adam’s appearance.  Thanks to Judge 
Magruder in Marshall v. Nugent, for the “bundle of risks” concept.  222 F.2d 604, 
611 (1st Cir. 1955). 
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convoluted series of “causes” of the accident.  This can 
lead, as it did in this case, to a spirited but irrelevant 
argument over whether plaintiff’s failure to check the 
front stoop was a superseding, intervening cause.  Not 
only does the “but for” test obfuscate the legal doctrine of 
causation, but it distorts the basic tort concept of duty.  
Thus in our case here, as the dissenting judge on the 
court of appeals panel noted, it can also be said that, as 
plaintiff stepped out the front entrance of the house, the 
defendants owed no duty to plaintiff at that time to repair 
the backyard gate.437 
Somewhat ironically, the jury was instructed on causation not 
on the basis of the but-for standard, but rather on the basis of the 
pattern jury instruction on direct cause.438  The instruction, JIG 140, 
stated that “[a] direct cause is a cause which had a substantial part 
in bringing about the (harm) (accident) (injury) (collision) 
(occurrence) [either immediately or through happenings which 
follow one after another].”439  The jury concluded in its answers to 
the special verdict questions that the defendants were negligent 
and that their negligence was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries,440 and it did so by concluding that the defendants’ 
negligence played a substantial part in bringing about the injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff.441 
What that means, of course, is that the same criticism the court 
leveled at the but-for standard might also apply to the substantial 
factor test the jury used in answering “yes” to the direct cause 
question on the special verdict form.  The substantial factor test 
certainly did not discourage the jury from finding a causal 
connection between the defendants’ negligence and the plaintiff’s 
injuries.  Lack of a causal relationship is not the problem in the 
case.  The problem is that any risk of injury created by the 
 
 437. Harpster, 512 N.W.2d at 586. 
 438. See Harpster Respondent’s Brief, supra note 427, at 5. 
 439. MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES―CIVIL, CIVJIG 140 
(Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, 3d ed. 1986). 
 440. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment at 1, 
Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994) (No. C9-93-787).  The 
appellants argued that there was no proximate cause, including an argument 
effectively claiming no cause in fact, in addition to arguing that the respondent’s 
conduct constituted a superseding cause.  Harpster Appellate Brief, supra note 
425, at 6–10. 
 441. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment, supra note 
440, at 1. 
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negligence of the defendants in failing to repair the gate did not 
encompass an injury to the plaintiff in slipping on the icy front 
steps of the house as she tried to find the errant dog. 
In summary, Kryzer’s denunciation of the but-for standard does 
not provide a clear basis for resolving cases where there seem to be 
real questions about making a person legally responsible for causes 
that seemed to have little to do with the injury the plaintiff 
sustained.  The comments to section 26, the causation section in 
the Third Restatement, note that courts have tried to distinguish 
events deemed unimportant or inappropriate for the imposition of 
liability, labeling them “conditions” rather than causes.442  The 
comment notes that “providing criteria to distinguish causes from 
conditions, which inevitably entails ambiguity and uncertainty, is 
unnecessary for legal purposes.”443  Kryzer illustrates the reasons for 
that concern. 
Harpster’s concern over the lack of limits on liability if but-for 
causation is used is understandable, but only if but-for causation is 
asked to carry too much freight in a negligence analysis.  There are 
other ways of eliminating any potential for liability for that cause.  
Duty arises when the defendant creates a risk of injury.  The act of 
getting up in the morning does not create a risk of injury, at least 
for most people.  Even if it creates some risks, injury occurring later 
in the day by some affirmative conduct by the defendant, negligent 
driving, for example, would not be the type of risk that would have 
made the initial conduct of getting up in the morning negligent. 
This is not meant as a criticism of the outcome of those cases.  
The results reached by the court in both Kryzer and Harpster may be 
justifiable, but resolution on alternative grounds would make the 
rationale for rejecting the claims more comprehensible.  Lawyers 
and judges have to work with in-house authority.  One of the 
problems is that there is not a clear analytical path for resolving 
cases where there seems to be a causal connection between 
conduct and injury but the injury is just too far removed from the 
original negligent action. 
Condemning the “but-for” standard does not provide a clear 
answer as to why there should not be liability in the hard cases.  
Harpster is an excellent illustration of the problem.  The court 
 
 442. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. d (2010). 
 443. Id. 
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criticized the result under a but-for analysis,444 but it was the 
substantial factor test that the jury applied in finding a causal 
connection between the negligence of the defendants and the 
plaintiff’s injuries.445  Something more is needed to explain why the 
defendants should not be liable.  The same with Kryzer.  The key to 
both is to answer the question of whether the injuries were within 
the scope of risk—the intoxication in Kryzer and the negligent gate 
repair in Harpster.  If the injury is not within the scope of liability 
there is no liability, even if factual causation is established. 
b. “But-for” Accepted 
The decisions rejecting the but-for standard do not tell the 
complete story, however.  There are cases where the supreme court 
has specifically adopted the but-for standard as the appropriate test 
for cause in fact. 
The but-for standard is the accepted means of establishing 
cause in fact in professional liability cases.446  In legal malpractice 
cases, the plaintiff must establish that but-for the defendant’s 
conduct, the plaintiff would have either “obtained a more favorable 
result in the underlying transaction than the result obtained”447 or 
where there is loss of or injury to a cause of action, that the loss or 
 
 444. Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994). 
 445. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment, supra 
note 440, at 1. 
 446. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 218 n.4 
(Minn. 2007); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Glickman, Isenberg, Lurie & Co., 273 
N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. 1978).  In Vernon J. Rockler, the court made it clear that 
the same standards applicable to legal malpractice actions apply to other 
professionals, including accountants: 
Accountants are held to the same standard of reasonable care as lawyers, 
doctors, architects, and other professional people engaged in furnishing 
skilled services for compensation.  Plaintiff in an accounting malpractice 
action must prove the elements delineated for a legal malpractice action . 
. . .  Thus, to recover in this case plaintiff would need to prove a duty (the 
existence of an accountant-client relationship), the breach of that duty 
(the failure of the accountants to discharge their duty of reasonable 
care), factual causation (that “but for” the advice plaintiff would not have 
made transfers), proximate causation (that plaintiff’s increased tax 
liability was a foreseeable consequence of defendants’ advice), and 
damages (that plaintiff actually suffered increased tax liability due to 
defendants’ advice). 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 447. Jerry’s Enters., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 711 
N.W.2d 811, 819 (Minn. 2006) (legal malpractice action arising from transactional 
matters). 
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injury would not have occurred but-for the conduct of the 
defendant.448 
Medical negligence cases are somewhat of a mystery.  The 
causation issue in those cases is often framed in terms of whether 
the injury “resulted from” the negligence of the physician.449  The 
ordinary meaning of the word “result” is “[t]o come about as a 
consequence” or “[t]he consequence of a particular action, 
operation, or course . . . .”450  Perhaps there would be more play in 
the definition, as opposed to asking whether a particular action 
would not have occurred but-for the negligence of the defendant, 
but “resulting from” does not seem to invite the sort of potentially 
qualitative judgment that the substantial factor test does. 
Application of the but-for standard in the professional liability 
cases might be explained on the basis that those cases just do not 
present the sorts of remote cause problems the court faced in cases 
such as Kryzer and Harpster.451  That does not explain away the root 
problem of how to deal with cases where the defendant’s 
negligence seems to be only remotely related to the plaintiff’s 
injury, however.  The but-for standard works to establish cause in 
fact.  The remote cause problem can more clearly be resolved by 
focusing on the standards for determining scope of liability issues. 
2. Scope of Liability 
In 1896, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Christianson v. 
Chicago, Saint Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co.452  The 
plaintiff was riding on a one hand car while a second car followed 
behind him.453  It was the plaintiff’s contention that when he looked 
behind and noticed how closely the second car was following, he 
 
 448. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695 (Minn. 
1980). 
 449. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993); Harvey v. Fridley 
Med. Ctr., P.A., 315 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 1982); Smith v. Knowles, 281 N.W.2d 
653, 656 (Minn. 1979). 
 450. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1487 (4th 
ed. 2009). 
 451. In legal malpractice cases, undue extensions of liability may be limited, 
for example, by categorical determinations concerning the scope of liability.  See, 
e.g., McIntosh Cnty. Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745 N.W.2d 538, 547 (Minn. 
2008) (limiting law firm’s liability to third parties to direct and intended 
beneficiaries of the legal services). 
 452. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). 
 453. Id. at 94–95, 69 N.W. at 640. 
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became dizzy, lost his balance, and fell off the car.454  The driver of 
the second car was not able to stop in time and hit the plaintiff, 
causing severe injuries.455  The defendants argued that the 
plaintiff’s injuries were not the proximate cause of their negligence 
because it was not reasonable to anticipate that the injuries would 
occur.456 
Justice Mitchell quickly dissolved this argument.  He stated 
that “[w]hat a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and 
may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, but is 
not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate 
cause of an injury which ensues.”457  In his opinion, 
“[c]onsequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an 
intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are 
natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original 
wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen 
the particular results which did follow.”458  The court held that the 
defendants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.459 
The supreme court reaffirmed Christianson in Dellwo v. 
Pearson460 in 1961, specifically addressing the role of foreseeability in 
proximate cause.461  The plaintiff and her husband were fishing off 
a boat when the defendant, a twelve-year-old boy operating a 
 
 454. Id. at 95, 69 N.W. at 640. 
 455. Id., 69 N.W. at 640. 
 456. Id. at 96, 69 N.W. at 641. 
 457. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641. 
 458. Id., 69 N.W. at 641. 
 459. Id.  In one case, Brown v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., the supreme court 
resisted the opportunity to add to Christianson’s understanding of proximate 
cause.  190 Minn. 81, 251 N.W. 5 (1933).  The case involved injuries sustained by a 
truck driver who was hit by a car after he was flagged down by Murphy’s truck 
driver to help him with repairs on his truck.  Id. at 83, 251 N.W. at 6.  The court, 
presented with arguments that the driver’s conduct was only a “necessary 
antecedent” and not a “responsible cause” of the accident, or that the conduct did 
not have a natural tendency to produce the result complained of, held that as a 
matter of law it could not say that the driver’s conduct was not a proximate cause 
of the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 85, 251 N.W.2d at 7.  The court said that “[w]ith no 
regret we decline the invitation of the case to add to the already excessive 
literature of the law dealing, or attempting to deal, with the doctrine of proximate 
cause, much of which both ‘in case and in commentary is mystifying and futile.’”  
Id. at 86, 251 N.W. at 7 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL 
SCIENCE 85 (1928)). 
 460. 259 Minn. 452, 452, 107 N.W.2d 859, 859 (1961). 
 461. Id. at 453–54, 107 N.W.2d at 860. 
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second boat, drove closely by them.462  The plaintiff’s fishing line got 
tangled in the propeller of the defendant’s outboard motor, 
causing the plaintiff’s fishing rod to be pulled down on the side of 
the boat and the rod to snap apart.463  A piece of the reel hit the 
plaintiff in the eye.464 
The trial court instructed the jury that “[a] person guilty of 
negligence is liable for all consequences which might reasonably 
have been foreseen as likely to result from one’s negligent act or 
omissions under the circumstances” and that “[a] wrongdoer is not 
responsible for a consequence which is merely possible according 
to occasional experience, but only for a consequence which is 
probable according to ordinary and usual experience . . . .”465 
The jury found for the defendant.466  The plaintiff appealed 
from the trial court’s judgment for the defendant, arguing, among 
other things,467 that the trial court’s proximate cause instruction was 
in error.468  The court went on to state that “[a]lthough a rigorous 
definition of proximate cause continues to elude us, nevertheless it 
is clear, in this state at least, that it is not a matter of foreseeability.”469  
Then, following a lengthy quoting of Christianson, the court said 
that “[i]t is enough to say that negligence is tested by foresight but 
proximate cause is determined by hindsight.”470 
By 2006, however, the court’s view of proximate cause appears 
to have changed.  In Lietz v. Northern States Power Co.,471 the plaintiff 
sued the power company over damages to its restaurant after a gas 
line explosion.472  The court said that “[t]here is proximate cause 
between a negligent act and an injury when the act is ‘one which 
the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have 
anticipated was likely to result in injuries to others.’”473  
 
 462. Id. at 452, 107 N.W. 2d at 860. 
 463. Id. at 452–53, 107 N.W.2d at 860.  
 464. Id., 107 N.W.2d at 860. 
 465. Id. at 453, 107 N.W.2d at 860. 
 466. Id., 107 N.W.2d at 860. 
 467. The plaintiff also argued that it was error to instruct the jury according to 
the child’s standard of care.  See id. at 457, 107 N.W.2d at 863.  The supreme court 
agreed, holding that children operating power boats, automobiles, and airplanes 
should be held to an adult standard of care.  Id. at 459, 107 N.W.2d at 863–64. 
 468. Id. at 453, 107 N.W.2d at 860. 
 469. Id. at 454–55, 107 N.W.2d at 861 (emphasis added). 
 470. Id. at 456, 107 N.W.2d at 862 (emphasis added). 
 471. 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006). 
 472. Id. at 868. 
 473. Id. at 872 (quoting Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 576 N.W.2d 496, 506 
(Minn. 1997)). 
  
2011] MINNESOTA NEGLIGENCE LAW 1121 
Foreseeability is now a part of the proximate cause formulation.474 
This turn in Minnesota law is directly traceable to Lubbers v. 
Anderson,475 in which the court said “that in order for a party’s 
negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury ‘the act [must 
be] one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to 
have anticipated was likely to result in injury to others, * * * though 
he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did 
happen.’”476  The issue in that case concerned the liability of a 
snowmobile driver ahead of the plaintiff who allegedly misled the 
plaintiff to driving into open water on a river where the plaintiff 
was then hit and injured by another snowmobile behind him.477  
Applying the proximate cause standard, the court held that there 
was no proximate cause between the first snowmobile driver’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.478 
Understanding this shift in the proximate cause formulation 
requires tracing the statement to its roots.  Lubbers quoted Wartnick 
v. Moss & Barnett,479 which in turn quoted Ponticas v. K.M.S. 
Investments,480 in which the court had read Christianson to say that 
[f]or negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, it 
must appear that if the act is one which the party ought, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was 
likely to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any 
injury proximately resulting from it, even though he could 
not have anticipated the particular injury which did 
happen.481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 474. See id. 
 475. 539 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1995). 
 476. Id. at 401 (quoting Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 
(Minn. 1992)). 
 477. Id. at 399–400. 
 478. Id. at 402. 
 479. Id. at 401 (quoting Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113). 
 480. Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113 (quoting Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 
907, 915 (Minn. 1983)). 
 481. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 915 (citing Christianson v. Chi., St. Paul, 
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 97, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896)). 
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This is faithful to Christianson.  Foreseeability relates to the 
breach issue, not proximate cause.482  There is negligence if the 
party should have anticipated likely injury to other.483  In that event, 
the person is then “liable for any injury proximately resulting” from 
the negligence, even if “he could not have anticipated the 
particular injury which did happen.”484 
But Lubbers changed that language.  Instead of foreseeable risk 
being a test for negligence, with proximate cause (where 
foreseeability is irrelevant) following, the statement is that for 
negligence to be the proximate cause, the person should have 
“anticipated [that the act] was likely to result in injury to others.”485  
The shift in the use of foreseeability is from negligence (properly 
for the breach issue, according to Christianson486) to proximate 
cause. 
To make it clearer, the following is the proximate cause 
formulation in Ponticas with the strikeout indicating the change 
made by the court in Lubbers: 
For negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, it 
must appear that if the act is one which the party ought, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was 
likely to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any 
injury proximately resulting from it, even though he could 
not have anticipated the particular injury which did 
happen.487 
 
 482. Christianson, 67 Minn. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641 (“What a man may reasonably 
anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is 
negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the 
proximate cause of an injury which ensues.  If a person had no reasonable ground 
to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, 
then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is 
negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and 
proximate consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not.”). 
 483. Id., 69 N.W. at 641. 
 484. Id., 69 N.W. at 641. 
 485. Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995). 
 486. Christianson, 67 Minn. at 96–97, 69 N.W. at 641. 
 487. Compare Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Minn. 1983) (“For 
negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that if the act is 
one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated 
was likely to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately 
resulting from it, even though he could not have anticipated the particular injury 
which did happen.”), with Lubbers, 539 N.W.2d at 401 (Minn. 1995) (“We have said 
that in order for a party’s negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury ‘the 
act [must be] one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have 
anticipated was likely to result in injury to others, . . . though he could not have 
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After Lubbers, then, the statement is that negligence is the 
proximate cause of the injury if the act is “one the party ought, in 
the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was likely to result 
in injury to others . . . .”488  The party need not have anticipated the 
particular injury which did happen.489  Lubbers then becomes the 
law, cited by the supreme court in cases from Canada v. McCarthy490 
to Lietz.491  Lubbers also added the substantial factor test to its 
proximate cause formulation.492 
The supreme court has also framed proximate cause as a solo 
requirement.  In Orwick v. Belshan,493 the plaintiff was injured while 
attempting to repair a farm machine owned by the defendant.494  
The trial court gave the following instruction on proximate cause 
to the jury: 
[B]y proximate cause is meant the direct or immediate 
cause, or the natural sequence of events without the 
intervention of another independent and efficient cause.  
Proximate cause is that which in a natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause 
produces the injuries and without which the result would 
not have occurred.495 
Responding to a request by the jury for clarification, the trial 
court added the following: “consequences which follow in 
unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from 
the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such 
consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though 
he could not have foreseen the particular results which did 
follow.”496 
 
 
 
 
anticipated the particular injury which did happen.’” (quoting Wartnick v. Moss & 
Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1992)). 
 488. 539 N.W.2d at 401 (quoting Wartnick, 490 N.W.2d at 113) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 489. Id. 
 490. 567 N.W.2d 496, 506 (Minn. 1997). 
 491. 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 2006). 
 492. 539 N.W.2d at 401–02 (citing Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 
1980)). 
 493. 304 Minn. 338, 231 N.W.2d 90 (1975). 
 494. Id. at 340–41, 231 N.W.2d at 93. 
 495. Id. at 349, 231 N.W.2d at 97. 
 496. Id., 231 N.W.2d at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The supreme court noted that the instruction was “technically” 
accurate and that Christianson had the court’s approval in the past497 
and continued to have its approval, but the court thought it 
preferable to instruct the jury in accordance with the pattern jury 
instructions on direct, concurring, and superseding cause, 
particularly in a case where there is no question concerning 
superseding cause.498  The causation test is the substantial factor 
test, and thus the test for proximate cause in Minnesota.  The court 
has reaffirmed that position in subsequent cases.499 
The potential for reading the proximate cause requirement in 
Minnesota as incorporating the dual elements of foreseeability and 
substantial factor or only the substantial factor standard creates 
confusion.  If the scope of liability issue is conflated with the cause 
in fact issue, the surviving standard is the substantial factor test.  
There are problems with that standard as a proximate cause 
standard500 because there is nothing in the standard that provides 
courts or juries with a means of evaluating the critical issue of 
whether the risk that resulted in injury to the plaintiff was one of 
the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent.501 
 
 497. Id. at 349, 349 n.10, 231 N.W.2d at 97, 97 n.10 (citing Dellwo v. Pearson, 
259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961); Seward v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 222 
Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221 (1946)); see cases cited supra notes 459–69. 
 498. 304 Minn. at 349–50, 231 N.W.2d at 98 (“Obviously, the jury had difficulty 
in trying to understand proximate cause on the basis of the trial court’s 
definition.”). 
 499. E.g., Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 372–73 (Minn. 
2008) (discussing a “material element or a substantial factor” as the necessary link 
between intoxication and injury in Minnesota dram shop actions); George v. 
Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006) (“Minnesota applies the 
substantial factor test for causation.”). 
 500. The conflation of factual and proximate cause has been criticized since its 
inception in the first and continuation in the Restatement Second.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6, Special Note on 
Proximate Cause (2010) (“Instead, . . . prior Restatements employed the umbrella 
term ‘legal cause’ to include both factual cause and proximate cause. . . .  [T]he 
term is . . . an especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected.”); 
see also id. §§ 26 cmt. a, 29 cmt. b. 
 501. Section 433 of the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934), for instance, sets 
out the following considerations to be used in determining whether an actor’s 
conduct is a substantial factor: 
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with 
one another important in determining whether the actor’s conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another: 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm 
and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; 
(b) whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the 
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The dual standard approach adopts the substantial factor test 
as the test for cause in fact and the reformatted Christianson inquiry 
for scope of liability.  While many jurisdictions use a foreseeability 
standard for resolving scope of liability issues,502 dealing with scope 
of liability issues without injecting foreseeability into the inquiry 
provides a clearer means of resolving those issues.503  The 
Christianson standard was intended to provide limits on liability, and 
for a time in Minnesota it was deemed to be an appropriate 
standard for juries to apply in deciding scope of liability issues.504  
Christianson has been repeatedly affirmed by the supreme court, 
but it was also rejected in favor of the substantial factor standard in 
order to achieve clarity for jury resolution of the cause in fact 
issue.505  Christianson seemed to fade until it was revived and 
reformed in Lubbers.506 
 
 
 
actor’s negligent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should 
have brought about the harm; 
(c) whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces 
which are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, 
or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for 
which the actor is not responsible; 
(d) lapse of time. 
 502. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
29 cmt. j (2010). 
 503. Id.  Comment j reads in part as follows: 
Although the risk standard in this Section is comparable to the 
foreseeability standard in actions based on negligence, the risk standard 
contained in this Section is preferable because it provides greater clarity, 
facilitates clearer analysis in a given case, and better reveals the reason 
for its existence.  The risk standard provides greater clarity and facilitates 
analysis because it focuses attention on the particular circumstances that 
existed at the time of the actor’s conduct and the risks that were posed by 
that conduct.  Risks may be foreseeable in context, as when an 
extraordinary storm is forecast, requiring precautions against the risks 
posed by it, that might otherwise be thought of, out of context, as 
exceedingly unlikely and therefore unforeseeable.  The risk standard 
focuses on the appropriate context, although a foreseeability standard, 
properly explained, could do this also.  The risk standard provides better 
understanding about the reasons for its existence by appealing to the 
intuition that it is fair for an actor’s liability to be limited to those risks 
that made the conduct wrongful.  Thus, factfinders can apply the risk 
standard with more sensitivity to the underlying rationale than they 
might muster with an unadorned foreseeable-harm standard. 
 504. See supra notes 458–68. 
 505. See supra notes 469–72. 
 506. See supra notes 473–76. 
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If, as Lubbers says, the proximate cause issue is usually for the 
jury,507 yet another question arises: whether in cases where there is a 
dispute over scope of liability, a jury would be instructed according 
to the foreseeability standard set out in Lubbers or, if Lubbers 
inaccurately interpreted the Christianson proximate standard as set 
out in cases such as Ponticas, whether a jury would presumably be 
instructed according to that standard.  Either way, it has not been 
the practice to instruct juries on the scope of liability issue in 
Minnesota.  The substantial factor test has been the primary jury 
instruction governing causation and, in some opinions of the court, 
the standard for determining proximate cause.  The lack of a 
clearly defined concept that applies to scope of liability issues in 
Minnesota has resulted in an overload of the substantial factor test. 
There is no reason why a jury could not be instructed in cases 
where proximate cause is in issue, however.  The question is what 
form the instruction might take.  There is a significant variance in 
the form of pattern instructions on proximate cause in the states.508  
 
 507. Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 1995). 
 508. Though civil jury instructions addressing causation vary from state to 
state, many do attempt to put some limit on liability as suggested in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 
(2010).  Vermont’s jury instructions specifically limit liability in a separate cause 
instruction.  VT. PLAIN ENGLISH CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., VERMONT CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 4-4.1 (LexisNexis 2008) (“The defendant is responsible for all the 
results of his negligence until the forces that his negligent act set in motion no 
longer have any effect.”).  New Jersey provides a definition of causation to the jury, 
but then cautions the jury in the last paragraph by attempting to impose a limit on 
liability.  COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES, NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY 
CHARGES 6.10 (LexisNexis 2009) (“The basic question for [the jury] to resolve is 
whether [the plaintiff’s injury/loss/harm] is so connected with the negligent 
actions or inactions of [the defendant] that . . . it is reasonable . . . that [the 
defendant] should be held wholly or partially responsible for [the 
injury/loss/harm].”). 
  Some states instruct the jury to limit liability using the concept of 
foreseeability.  E.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL PJI 2:12 (Westlaw 
2011) [hereinafter N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“A person is only responsible for the 
results of his or her conduct if the risk of injury is reasonably foreseeable.”); MISS. 
JUDICIAL COLL., MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL § 15:3 (Westlaw 2010–
2011) [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (stating that an “element or test 
of proximate cause is that an ordinarily prudent person should reasonably have 
foreseen that some injury might probably occur as a result of his negligence”); 
VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 12:13 (Westlaw 2010–11) [hereinafter VIRGINIA JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS] (stating that the defendant “is not charged with foreseeing that 
which could not reasonably be expected to happen, nor for casualties which, 
though possible, were wholly improbable”); COLO. SUP. CT. COMM. ON CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 9:21 (Westlaw 2010) 
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The reporters for the Third Restatement of Torts gave it a shot in 
suggesting four potential instructions.509  This is one of the four: 
 
[hereinafter COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (stating that the defendant is not the 
cause of injury unless injury to a person in the plaintiff’s position was “a reasonably 
foreseeable result of that negligence”); UTAH SUP. CT., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS], MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL CV209 (LexisNexis 
2009) [hereinafter UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (stating that cause requires that the 
actor’s conduct “could be foreseen by a reasonable person to produce a harm of 
the same general nature”); MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1.8 
(Westlaw 2008) (stating that in order to establish causation “the plaintiff must 
show that the harm was reasonably foreseeable to a person in the defendant’s 
position at the time of the defendant’s negligence”). 
  Many states utilize language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
433 (1965) when defining proximate cause in an attempt to limit liability.  E.g., 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, OHIO JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL CV 405.1 (Westlaw 2011); WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL WPI 15.01 (Westlaw 2011); MISSISSIPPI JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 508, §15:3; VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 508, § 12:13; ALA. 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., ALABAMA PATTER JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, 
ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL APJI 33.00 (Westlaw 2010); COLORADO 
JURY INSTRUCTION, supra note 508, § 9.18; FLA. SUP. CT. COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY 
CHARGES, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 401.12 (Westlaw 
2010); CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS COMM., INDIANA MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1117 
(LexisNexis 2010); ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL AMI 501 (Westlaw 
2009); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 15.01 (Westlaw 2009); NEB. SUP. 
CT. COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, NEBRASKA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 
NJI2d Civ. 3.41 (Westlaw 2009) (defining proximate cause as “a cause . . . that 
produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence”); NORTH DAKOTA 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL C - 2.15 (2008); ANDERSON’S SOUTH CAROLINA 
REQUESTS TO CHARGE—CIVIL §20-2 (Westlaw 2009); UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 508, § 209. 
  Other states apply the substantial factor test found in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 431 (1965).  E.g., N.Y. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 508, § 
2:70; CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS BAJI 3.76 (Westlaw 2010); HON. DONALD 
G. ALEXANDER, MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 7-80 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. 
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 1500 
(2010); ALASKA CT. SYS. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., ALASKA CIVIL 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 03.07 (LexisNexis 2008); MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 508, § 2.1.8; HAW. SUP. CT., HAWAII STANDARD CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS No. 7.1 (LexisNexis 1999). 
 509. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
29 cmt. b reporters’ note (2010).  The first three suggested instructions are as 
follows: 
(1) You must decide whether the harm to the plaintiff is within the scope 
of the defendant’s liability.  To do that, you must first consider why you 
found the defendant negligent [or some other basis for tort liability].  
You should consider all of the dangers that the defendant should have 
taken reasonable steps [or other tort obligation] to avoid.  The 
defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s harm if you find that the plaintiff’s 
harm arose from the same general type of danger that was one of those 
that the defendant should have taken reasonable steps [or other tort 
obligation] to avoid.  If the plaintiff’s harm, however, did not arise from 
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You must decide whether the plaintiff’s harm was of 
the same general type of harm that the defendant 
should have acted to avoid.  If you find that it is, you 
shall find for the plaintiff.  If you find that it is not 
the same general type, you must find for the 
defendant.510 
Elimination of the last two sentences would make the 
instruction, with an appropriate special verdict question, suitable 
for use in special verdict jurisdictions such as Minnesota. 
D. A Short Summary of Minnesota Law 
Foreseeability plays a prominent role in Minnesota tort law.  It 
is an integral part of both the duty511 and proximate cause512 
determinations.  The supreme court has both rejected and 
accepted the but-for test for causation,513 depending on the type of 
case, although the predominant standard for deciding causation 
issues is the substantial factor test.514 
The emphasis on foreseeability as a primary determinant of 
duty, even without a focus on whether the specific harm could have 
been anticipated, gives courts significant latitude in determining 
whether they think a particular injury was foreseeable.  They 
 
the same general dangers that the defendant failed to take reasonable 
steps [or other tort obligation] to avoid, then you must find that the 
defendant is not liable for the plaintiff’s harm. 
(2) You must decide whether the harm to the plaintiff is within the scope 
of the defendant’s liability.  The plaintiff’s harm is within the scope of 
defendant’s liability if that harm arose from the same general type of 
danger that was among the dangers that the defendant should have 
taken reasonable steps [or other tort obligation] to avoid.  If you find 
that the plaintiff’s harm arose from such a danger, you shall find the 
defendant liable for that harm.  If you find the plaintiff’s harm arose 
from some other danger, then you shall find for the defendant. 
(3) To decide if the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s harm, think 
about the dangers you considered when you found the defendant 
negligent [or otherwise subject to tort liability].  Then consider the 
plaintiff’s harm.  You must find the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s 
harm if it arose from one of the dangers that made the defendant 
negligent [or otherwise subject to tort liability].  You must find the 
defendant not liable for harm that arose from different dangers. 
Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. See supra Part IV.A. 
 512. See supra Part IV.C. 
 513. See supra Part IV.C.1.a–b. 
 514. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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regularly engage in a fact-specific analysis of the foreseeability of an 
injury, holding that the lack of foreseeability mandates a 
conclusion that there is no duty in the case.515 
The proximate cause issue has been framed in various ways by 
the supreme court, leaving open the question as to what the 
standard is for determining scope of liability issues.  Using 
foreseeability as a workhorse in the duty determination means that 
decisions holding that there is no proximate cause as a matter of 
law are fewer in number.  When cases arise where the duty is clear, 
however, and courts are bothered by the remoteness of an injury to 
the defendant’s conduct, they do rely on proximate cause concepts 
to limit liability. 
The outcome then depends on how the court defines 
proximate cause in a particular case.  If it is conflated with the 
prevailing cause in fact standard and the substantial factor 
standard,516 and cause in fact seems to be established, courts may 
have to resort to a conclusion that a defendant’s conduct was 
simply the “occasion” for an injury.517  Or the court may conclude 
that even though a jury found causation, it must have done so on 
the basis of a “but-for” analysis, which some cases say is taboo.  It is 
also possible that a court may conclude that the prevailing 
proximate cause test is whether the injury is foreseeable and hold 
that there is no proximate cause because a particular injury is not 
foreseeable. 
Lawyers argue cases in terms of existing precedent.  They will 
argue that injuries are not foreseeable and that cases should be 
dismissed on summary judgment, either because of a lack of duty 
or proximate cause, or perhaps that there is no breach as a matter 
of law.  The continuing emphasis will be on the foreseeability of 
 
 515. E.g., Garrett v. Reuben, No. A09-1804, 2010 WL 2266401, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. June 8, 2010) (no duty because heart attack suffered some time after the 
collapse of a wall on landowner’s property was not foreseeable); Jewell v. Backes, 
No. A07-2358, 2008 WL 4133865, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008) (no duty 
because injury to plaintiff from horse bite not foreseeable); Ransom v. Bethany 
Acad., No. A07-1769, 2008 WL 3289853, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008) 
(no duty because injury to student from thrown football during basketball practice 
not foreseeable); Doe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 152, No. A06-611, 2007 WL 92904, at 
*6–7  (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (no duty because sexual assault of student in 
sports center owned and operated by city not foreseeable); Watkins v. Greyhound 
Bus Lines, Inc., No. A04-150, 2004 WL 2049977, at *2–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 
2004) (no duty because assault in bus station not foreseeable). 
 516. See supra notes 399–04. 
 517. See Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994). 
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risk.518  Motions for summary judgment will be based on the lack of 
duty or the lack of proximate cause due to the unforeseeability of 
the injury.  The emphasis has to be on a close analysis of the 
specific facts in the case to make those determinations.  The Third 
Restatement of Tort’s approach redirects judicial energy, taking 
away foreseeability as a determinant of duty and proximate cause 
and leaving it to the jury in many cases.519  That does not mean that 
courts are powerless to decide in individual cases that there is no 
duty or that the injury is not within the scope of the defendant’s 
responsibility, or even that there is no breach as a matter of law, 
but, particularly in the latter case, it will be with appropriate 
deference to civil juries. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Third Restatement of Torts offers to clarify negligence law 
and achieve an appropriate judge-jury balance by stripping 
foreseeability from the duty and scope of liability determinations.520  
No-duty determinations are exceptional and should be based upon 
an “articulated countervailing principle or policy” that “warrants 
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.”521  The 
Third Restatement separates scope of liability from cause in fact 
and adopts but-for causation as the appropriate standard for 
resolving factual causation issues.  Whether the Third 
Restatement’s offer is accepted in any degree by a court depends 
on the court’s perception of whether the law of negligence in its 
state poses any of the problems the Third Restatement formulation 
is intended to avoid. 
 
 
 
 518. The briefs in Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009), are an 
excellent example.  The appellant argued that the defendants owed a duty to the 
minor plaintiff and that the exact manner of injury did not have to be foreseeable.  
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 3–5, 12, Foss v. Kincade 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009) 
(No. A07-0313), 2008 WL 6191415, at *3–5, *12.  The respondent argued that 
there was no duty because the injury was not foreseeable, and that clear cases of 
foreseeability should be decided by the courts.  Respondents’ Brief, Foss v. 
Kincade 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009) (No. A07-0313), 2008 WL 6191416, at *7–
11.  
 519. The way juries are instructed, then, becomes especially important.  See 
supra notes 393–95 and accompanying text. 
 520. See supra Part II. 
 521. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7(b) (2010). 
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Courts have greeted the Third Restatement with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm.522  The courts that have followed it and 
removed foreseeability from the duty determination have done so 
because they have recognized that the fact-specific nature of the 
foreseeability analysis is more suited to a jury resolution and that 
removing foreseeability from duty determinations will clarify the 
reasons for no-duty findings. 
Separating foreseeability from the duty determination does 
not mean that a court will accept the second part of the Third 
Restatement’s duty provision, however.  Courts may take a more 
cautious approach than did the Iowa Supreme Court in Thompson 
v. Kaczinski523 and remove foreseeability from the duty 
determination but leave their approach to the other elements of 
negligence law intact, at least until issues concerning the 
application of those elements are directly presented to them.  
Courts may continue to adhere to their traditional multifactor 
standards for resolving duty decisions, even if they decide to 
remove foreseeability as a duty consideration.  Or given its 
preference for its history and traditions in resolving duty disputes, a 
court may completely reject the Third Restatement’s duty 
formulation, as did the Delaware Supreme Court in Riedel.524 
As Minnesota lawyers and judges determine whether and how 
to use the Third Restatement, it becomes important to first 
understand the current structure of Minnesota negligence law.525  
Foreseeability in Minnesota negligence law has received varied 
treatment over the years.  Foreseeability in current law relates to 
duty, breach, and proximate cause, with cause in fact usually 
determined according to the substantial factor test.  The substantial 
factor is often advanced as the test for proximate cause, although 
some more recent statements of the proximate cause standard turn 
on the foreseeability of the injury.  Negligence law is currently 
structured to give courts significant latitude in deciding that no 
duty exists or that there is no proximate cause, both based on the 
lack of foreseeability of a particular injury. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has seemingly accepted the 
substantial factor test as the preferred means for determining cause  
 
 
 522. See supra Part III. 
 523. See case analysis supra notes 35–80. 
 524. See supra Part III.F. 
 525. See supra Part IV. 
  
1132 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
in fact and rejected the but-for standard because of the lack of 
limits of that test.  That criticism would be understandable if there 
were no other means of limiting liability, but limiting liability to the 
same general risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent in 
the first place ensures that liability will be subject to reasonable 
limits.  In some cases, however, the but-for is the prevailing 
standard for cause in fact.  Professional malpractice cases are good 
examples of this.526  If the standard works there, it can work 
elsewhere in negligence law, but only if there are other limits to the 
scope of a defendant’s liability. 
Proximate cause has perhaps been the subject of the greatest 
uncertainty in Minnesota law.527  The proximate cause standard has 
been formulated in various ways, more recently incorporating 
foreseeability as a key factor, although that is clearly inconsistent 
with prior precedent.  The other problem is that conflating the 
proximate cause and cause in fact standards with the substantial 
factor standard as the test for both leaves courts with inadequate 
means of resolving scope of liability issues. 
The reception of the Third Restatement in Minnesota will 
depend on whether the courts accept not only the Restatement’s 
black letter, but also the policy justifications for the position it takes 
on negligence law.  The supreme court would have to be convinced 
that incorporating foreseeability in its duty and proximate cause 
determinations has resulted in decisions that really are fact-specific 
and generally better suited for jury resolution and that removing 
the foreseeability issue from duty and proximate cause will avoid 
decisional inconsistency and result in a clearer explanation of the 
reasons for no-duty or no-proximate cause determinations.  The 
court may conclude that it is perfectly appropriate for courts to 
carefully scrutinize the foreseeability of an injury, whether for duty 
or proximate cause purposes, and that Minnesota law appropriately 
balances the roles of judge and jury.  If so, it will reject the Third 
Restatement’s approach, at least in part. 
The second part of the Third Restatement’s duty formulation 
indicates the sorts of cases where no-duty determinations are 
appropriately made on a categorical basis.  That would present 
nothing new for the court, which regularly makes those categorical 
determinations in resolving duty issues.  While the courts may be  
 
 526. See supra Part IV.C.1.b. 
 527. See supra Part IV.C. 
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reluctant to deviate from what seems to be settled reliance on a 
substantial factor standard for determining cause in fact issues, the 
scope of liability issue remains problematic, given the lack of a clear 
standard for resolving that issue. 
Favoring the substantial factor test over the but-for standard 
may present problems.  Minnesota courts sometimes adopt the but-
for standard for resolving factual causation issues, particularly in 
professional liability cases, and sometimes the courts adhere to the 
substantial factor test.  Neither test is a guarantee that liability will 
be limited, however, as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harpster v. Hetherington indicates.528 
Irrespective of how the factual causation issue is resolved, 
there still has to be a reasoned basis for resolving scope of liability 
issues.  In Minnesota, reliance on the substantial factor test as the 
test for proximate cause has led to some awkward decisions where 
the court has concluded that a factual cause was just the “occasion” 
for an injury, but not the real cause.529  A scope of liability standard 
appropriately applied gives courts a more direct way to deal with 
cases where the injury sustained by the plaintiff is beyond the scope 
of the risk that made the defendant’s conduct negligent in the first 
place. 
Whether or not courts choose to follow its approach, the Third 
Restatement performs a valuable function in inviting courts to 
evaluate their own negligence law to determine whether it is 
structured in a clear way that judges and lawyers can understand 
and apply with consistency and that achieves proper balance in the 
judge-jury relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 528. See case analysis supra notes 412–44. 
 529. See supra note 411. 
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